"Principles of Military Intervention in the Balkans and Beyond: aNATO Practitioner's Perspective

"Principles of MilitaryIntervention in the Balkans and Beyond: a NATO Practitioner's Perspective."

Jack D. Segal

Andalo, Italy January 23, 2002

Theviews expressed in this presentation represent those of the author and shouldnot be construed to represent the views of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation or its member nations.

Sincethe demise of the Soviet Union, military missions have changed. The simple and clear -- some might say,comfortable -- situation that dominated the NATO-Warsaw Pact stalemate from1949 to 1999 has been replaced by a far messier range of new demands.

Today’smilitary has to be organised, trained and equipped to perform effectively in avery diverse and demanding range of missions. Here is just a sampling. On the left end of the spectrum we might envision militaryforces in the United States performing missions to deter and protect againsthijackings and terrorism, or UK forces in Sierra Leone using just theirpresence to persuade warring factions to stop fighting. Toward the middle comesmissions such as those the NATO and partner nations are currently performing inthe Balkans. To the right suchmissions as those the British-led force is performing in Afghanistan come intothe picture, along with the simultaneous war-fighting role being played by asmall coalition of US, UK, French and Dutch special forces.

Therequirement that forces be able to operate across this broad mission spectrumis new. It means that the forcesthemselves must be far more versatile than was previously thoughtpossible.

NATOdoctrine since the 1999 Washington Summit has gone through a significantevolution. Today, it emphasizesthat political, diplomatic, economic, legal, civil, humanitarian and militaryefforts all combine to form a political-military strategy for dealing with acrisis. With policy direction fromthe political leadership, NATO applies its standing and agreed concepts anddoctrine to the application of military capabilities.

Theapplication of those capabilities encompasses far more than just bringingcombat power to bear on a situation, as I will describe later in my talk.

Thispolitical-military interface implies that a consensus has been reached betweenthe military and political leadership on how the military aspects of the effortwill be carried out.

Butsome of the objectives of the two groups -- civilian and military -- can because for disagreements among decision-makers. For example, politicians normally want to apply militaryforce gradually to allow time and manoeuvre room for diplomatic solutions. But the military wants to apply forcedecisively to bring the fighting to a successful conclusion as quickly aspossible. So my first point is to understand that both groups ofdecision-makers have to understand the interests of the other, and thatrequires that they know something about each other's perspective.

Itis also important to understand the vulnerability created by thedecision-making capabilities of nearly every political-military process used bywestern nations today. I referhere to the risks created by assymetric conflicts -- the latest popular termfor this is "netwar".

Theconcern is that your adversary will be able to make decisions more quickly thanyou will. While our hierarchicalsystems are methodically evaluating information, comparing options anddeveloping strategies, our adversaries may well be organised in an entirelydifferent way.

Lookat the examples of the anti-globalisation demonstrations in Genoa and Seattleor the activities of al-Quaida. Ineach case 21st century technologies - cell phones and the Internet - combinedwith primitive technologies like drums and whistles enabled networks oflike-minded people to outmanoeuvre a seemingly more powerful andbetter-equipped force. Often thereis no leader, or there are several of equal or near-equal statures. There is no hierarchy to exploit oreliminate, no clear centre to attack. These networked organisations pose a severe challenge to classicalmilitary structures and doctrine that we are only beginning to understand. Is al-Qaida destroyed or merely inhiding?

Despitethis challenge, military forces are increasingly being thrust into peacekeeping situations that exposethis very vulnerability. TheInternational security force in Afghanistan is just the most recent example.

Wesend ordinary troops with standard military equipment into violent, dynamicpeacekeeping situations with full exposure to public scrutiny through theubiquitous presence of the media. In this supercharged environment a singlemistake can turn public opinion, harden the resolve of the adversary or weakenthe will of one’s own population.

Notall troops are ordinary, however. In Afghanistan the combat forces you saw represented one end of the spectrum-- the highly trained Special Forces and special operations troops that areable to operate with minimal support and are best suited for extremelydangerous, fast moving situations, normally not peacekeeping.

Atthe other end of the spectrum are troops like Italy’s Carabinieri, DutchMarechaussee, French Gendarmerie and similar para-military forces that have asignificant degree of police training and are as prepared to use conflictresolution methods as they are bullets.

Eventhese specialised forces however need equipment that is appropriate for eachsituation they are likely to face. Shields, helmets and rubber bullets are the basic tools for urbanconflict situations. But manynations refuse to equip their military forces with these tools on theassumption that this will weaken their war-fighting capabilities, reduce theeffort devoted to classic national defence missions and expose the troopsthemselves to unacceptable risks.

Forcesequipped with these new technologies will be able to use far less firepower andplace it far more accurately, leading in turn to less collateral damage andfewer unintended casualties. Thiswill tend to make the forces more useable for political ends. That is the second main point - moreuseable forces might be used more.

Nowwithin this framework of vulnerabilities, concepts and capabilities, I wouldlike to talk a bit about how NATO is building capabilities for the new missionspectrum I referred to earlier.

ButNATO is first and foremost a political organization and the decision was madein 1993 to broaden the scope of participation in NATO's activities through thePartnership for Peace -- PfP.

PfPis open to all members of the EAPC which in turn was descendent from theNAC-C. Some people here still knowwhat I'm talking about and they should be worried about that.

The26 PfP members organize themselves according to what they want from NATO. NATO does not choose who will beeligible for membership -- the nations choose themselves. We would love to see Switzerland bringits sophisticated forces and well-trained troops into NATO, but they're not yetinterested. Other countries thatare interested are perhaps less attractive to the operational commanders whomust actually employ NATO forces in a crisis.

Justa word here on Russia: At theDecember NATO Miinisterials the members decided to engage with Russia on a newapproach to Russia's role in NATO. Yes, Russia is very much in NATO and as was properly pointed out here,Russia was disappointed by its role in NATO's decision making, particularlycoming to a head over Kosovo. wehave been in a holding pattern ever since, but December represented an attemptat a new start. Russia says itdoes not want a veto over collective defence decisions anbd it does not want tobe a member of NATO. But Russiaalso does not choose to disengage from NATO and we see that as a very importantopportunity.

Certainguidelines are part of the PfP program but obviously, NATO cannot impose itsstandards or expectations on partners, unless they declare themselves to beaspiring members and join the applicable PfP programs that lead tocandidacy.

Butif a country does opt for candidacy for membership, here I want to clear uip amisconception. NATO can and doesimpose pretty stringent requirements on aspiring member nations -- not asstringent perhaps as the EU which sometimes seems more intent on keepingcountries out, but not a free ride either. Such aspirants and required to comply with key norms such ascompliance with OSCE principles of human rights, establishment of clearpolitical control of the armed forces, resolution of border disputes andelimination of racial and ethnic discrimination within their forces.

Thispreparation through PfP is essential to the success of the Balkanmissions. Because what NATO todaygives -- and what the EU might someday give to its military structure is acommon language. First, I meanjust that -- the English language.

Whenthe French and Germans first combined forces into a joint unit, the Frenchinfantry literally could not speak to the German artillery because neitherspoke the other’s language…not a situation you want to be in if youare in command. So becauseAmericans speak only English and Europeans are realistic enough to know it ishopeless to expect Americans to learn a European language, NATO units useEnglish.

Butthe other equally important common language the NATO-led forces in the Balkansshare is NATO's unique procedures, doctrine and terminology -- the tools soldiersand sailors need to work within NATO. In addition, equipment has been rationalised. For example, France provides petrol for all units in theBalkans and it comes from standardised pipe fittings that all NATO units useand all partner forces must deal with to be part of the NATO force. It is only through suchstandardisation that the mission in Afghanistan could have been put together soquickly. So even though it is nota NATO mission, it has NATO’s imprint all over it.

This“interoperability” is perhaps the most obvious operational benefitof the PfP program. But there isalso the psychological and political effect that serving with NATO forces hason partner nations.

Forrelatively less capable forces the experience of serving with NATO tends toraise their performance and tends to cause them to comply to norms of behaviourand operational procedures that they probably would not have independentlyarrived at.

Forthe more capable PfP partners that are not seeking membership -- countries likeRussia, Finland, Switzerland, Austria or Sweden -- exposure to NATO provides achance to measure their own forces' capabilities against a standard. Their participation also allowsNATO forces to do the same against these capable, well-trained, disciplined andwell-equipped troops.

Inthe Balkans, NATO has installed three independent command structures to run theoperations and to provide guidance and leadership to non-NATO participants.These command structures are reviewed every six months, as are the levels oftroop commitments

Allowme to mention briefly each of the major Balkan deployments.

InBosnia, now over six years since the initial deployment of SFOR, there remainover 18,400 troops representing all the NATO nations plus 13 partners and fourother nations.

Thelargest contingents are the US (3150), France (2485), the UK (1770), Germany(1753) and Italy (1598).

Inour view, these troops are accomplishing their mission of:

· Deterring a resumption of hostilities and promoting a climate conduciveto a peace process

· Patrolling the zone of separation and some 766 cantonment sites

· Carrying out inspections and confiscating weapons

· Monitor training and movements of armed forces

· Monitoring and assisting the de-mining efforts

· Removing unauthorised checkpoints

· Repairing bridges, roads and rail lines

· Assisting in opening airports for civilian use

· Controlling the airspace, and

· Ensuring force protection and freedom of movement.

But how does it actually work on the ground? For the answer I have drawn on theexperiences of senior officers in NATO who have led the forces in Bosnia andnumerous middle grade officers who served there -- admittedly not a scientificsampling but one I would argue is pretty reliable.

One senior officer summed up his work this way. He sought to be “firm, fair, andfriendly.”

First, he had to be firm by demonstrating hisdetermination to carry out his mission. In fact, each senior officer reported that they were tested rather earlyon by the warlords, criminal leaders, local officials, and dare I say, even UN,NGO and IO officials who had been there longer than the newcomer. The new man - no women yet -- had todemonstrate that they were going to enforce those elements of the politicalagreements and mandates that underpinned the NATO presence - the generalframework agreement for peace, the instructions to the parties and thesupporting UN actions.

Secondly, they had to make deals with some veryunsavoury characters. Until suchtime as the rule of law prevails in Bosnia, control of the streets rests atleast partially with un-elected players who tend to exert a great deal ofinfluence and who have assumed a key role in the overall security picture.

For their own purposes, often related to illegalactivities in which they were deeply engaged, these non-state players sought toestablish a relationship with the force commander. The force commander in effect recognized their role in thesociety and in so doing acknowledged that NATO cannot be everywhere all thetime. A compromise must bereached, “red lines” drawn, and occasionally some undesirableactivities tolerated to avoid putting the forces into a situation where theircredibility is damaged.

One can criticise this acceptance of a coalition ofinterests but one would have to be very naive to think the system would workwithout such co-operation.

With respect to the NGOs and IOs, different tacticsare in order. In their case, thecommander must try to bring them together in a co-ordinated effort aimed at auseful goal. This is not easy since for the most part they do not want to bedirected to do anything by anyone outside their organisation and certainly notby the military.

But this is not a zero sum game; rather the cardtable model of game theory -- which I only vaguely understand -- might be moreappropriate. The commander mustfind the incentives to co-operation that will entice the NGO or IO to concludethat it is in its own best interests to work with that commander. Perhaps military resources will be directedtoward those NGOs that are willing to discuss their common goals and not tothose that will not. A creativecommander can over time move from a process somewhat like trying to get a herdof cats to do tricks to one in which their is acknowledgement that mosteveryone is seeking the same or mutually reinforcing objectives.

The next thing the commander must do is to befair. If the forces are perceivedto be taking sides, their ability to influence the party that sees itself asexcluded is minimal. This isno small task where forces are in daily contact with the population and maywell see that one side is not complying with its obligations far more oftenthan another. How to getcompliance without appearing to be biased in such a situation is not easy.

Finally, the commander tries to be friendly. That means walking the streets (and, Imight add, being vulnerable personally). Every commander I talked to described the consumption of massive amountsof “Slivovitz” as a prerequisite for success in Bosnia and a majoroccupational hazard.

In pursuing their mission, a great deal ofresponsibility rests with the sector commanders - normally BrigadierGenerals. They meet with the localofficials, deploy their troops to the hot spots, respond to crises and theyknow who is doing what to whom. They use their contacts to keep track of the security situation and totry to broker compromises over specific issues such as a particular crossroadsthat has become a flash point. These officers are doing conflict resolution at the retail level everyday. They work extremely hard andif they are successful no one knows their name. They try to enlist the local media to get their messagesacross to the local populations and to try to draw the population into an acceptanceof the peacekeepers as a positive influence on the local security situation.

Another thing the commander does is to draw some firm“red lines.” “Noharm must come to my troops,” was the most common. Force would be met with force. In Bosnia those “red lines”are now well understood and incidents are rare. In Kosovo and FYROM, the situation is less settled.

The assessment of the situation in the Bosnia ismixed. Certainly a more secureenvironment has been created. But the peace process has two basic aspects -- civil and military andthese clearly need to be better integrated.

I'll return to that third key point shortly.

The key question on the table right now in Brusselsis whether NATO should reduce itsmilitary presence in the Balkans?

The pros:

This would break the cycle of dependence and make thepopulation responsible for its own future. It could force the IOs and BiH authorities to speed up thetake-over of civil functions, and where necessary, deal with the underlyingcauses for failure to do this sooner. Force reducitons might encourage faster installationof the necessary mechanisms for regional co-operation (which are hampered solong as the international community runs key institutions). Finally, it would be consistent with NATO'smembers desires to reduce the cost and open'ended nature of the currentcommitments.

The cons:

It could put at risk the very secure environment thatis necessary for all progress. Itwould take place prior to needed military reforms. It would come before a strong local police and independentjudiciary is in place thereby putting at risk the EU’s plan to take overthe International Police Task Force’s function by 1 Jan 03. Finally, it could encourage thealready-strong centrifugal forces that are pulling the three communities apartand away from a multiethnic solution and regional co-operation.

But this begs the question of what is the proper exitstrategy for NATO forces?

Should the transition be event-driven or on atimetable, as most NATO allies prefer. There has been little institution building at the BiH level. Yet is it reasonable to expect suchinstitution building to gain support in the current political environment? Many problems have not beenaddressed: the investment pictureremains skewed with most investors going to the Federation and few to theRepublik Serpska. Although oftencited to show progress, I would contend that minority return statistics aremisleading. NATO commanders reportthat many people are returning solely to sell their property. Finally, less than 10 percent ofdemining is complete (30 of 400 sq. miles), political oversight of the militaryremains weak and defence reforms are not progressing.

The next steps in Bosnia from a military perspectiveare to turn over as quickly as possible the police functions, both to getNATO’s forces out of that business and to bring up the level of the localpolice. But the upcomingBosnian elections in October are a concern and one should not expect anyprecipitous change to the mission or the size of the force before then.

In Kosovo itself, about 35,000 troops are distributedin the five sectors as shown here, plus support troops in Albania andFYROM.

Given the clear and present danger of a politicalstalemate there, the security situation remains tense. The Kosovo mission is stable from amilitary standpoint, but despite Milosevic’s ouster, the underlyingcauses of the original conflict remain. The linkages to smuggling and illegal activities in Albania and FYROM,the lack of trust between the two communities and the political instability inthe province all conspire to suggest that another long-term commitment has beenentered into.

The military forces in both Bosnia and Kosovo arenonetheless engaged fully in more than just keeping the sides separated.

In both Bosnia and Kosovo, the IOs and NGOs work inmany of the same areas as the Civil-Military Co-operation elements of theforces. CIMIC is of growingimportance in NATO military doctrine and in the forces of the NATO membernations. The shift from Cold Warhigh-intensity warfare has allowed this function to gain prominence andresources.

There is a very wide range of activities CIMIC troopsengage in today. Increasingly,military assets such as road-building equipment, engineers, water and wastemanagement experts, health care and police are working in concert with thenon-NATO agencies. Again, thecreativity of the commander is crucial. If there is good communication with the IOs and NGOs, a great deal can beaccomplished. This is another ofthe non-conventional military missions that can prove useful in resolving aconflict but, as I have outlined in the Balkans, these capabilities do notsubstitute for progress on the civilian-political side.

So what to do to bring the civil and military effortsmore into harmony?

Well, an astute observer of the Balkan mission hasbeen former Finnish President Ahtisaari. Along with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, he was a key player in theKosovo negotiations. he has experiencefrom many earlier peacekeeping efforts from Namibia to the Middle East. Recently to a NATO audience he putforward some important proposals for bringing these two functions closertogether:

QUOTE:

· We know that force alone cannot create a stable society and functioninginstitutions. Yet theinternational community has been slow in developing the capacity to deployadequate civilian resources. Inorder to prevent the spread of lawlessness and to protect members of minoritygroups, trained police officers, judges and civil administrators should be atthe disposal of the international community and ready for deployment at muchshorter notice than is now possible.

· There is a lot that can be learned from the military by civilianmissions in the areas of planning, recruitment, deployment and training ofpersonnel. In particular, theabsence of a common institutional and management culture inside operations,shortcomings in communications and co-operation between internationalorganisations and gaps in management skills are still part of the everydayreality in field operations.

· There are also major cultural and operational differences between civiland military organisations that impede co-operation and reduce theeffectiveness of each. Mechanismsfor sharing experiences, methodologies, ideas )and I would add, intelligence)are needed. One obvious way isjoint training for senior civilian administrators together with high rankingmilitary and police officers.

UNQUOTE

Muchof this work must be done by the civilian sector. But the military would welcome having a civilian counterpartto its own planning and exercise structure. And why not? Why cannot the ICRC, UNHCR and World Food Program send representativesto participate in NATO Peace Support exercises? Both sides would learn from the other.

Nowas we discussed previously in this course, military intervention is always thelast resort and has not been an option at times simply because there was noready capability to deploy. Hereis where NATO members and partners are about to complicate your life. I refer to something called theCombined Joint Task Force.

Commonto the full range of missions I discussed earlier, the Balkan experiencedemonstrated a deficiency in NATO and more generally among military - and as wehave just heard, civilian -- organisations. To deploy for war-fighting was relatively straightforward,but to deploy to a peace support, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement missionhas proven far more difficult. The recognition of the need for a more logicalapproach has led to investment in a new concept called the Combined Joint TaskForce (CJTF):

FormerNATO Secretary General Manfred Wòrner described CJTF as a means toprovide the flexibility for NATO and non-NATO forces to act together inpeacekeeping operations by organising command elements that can be rapidlydetached form existing command structures and augmented with additionalforces.

Thisconcept is being developed now. Itis a capability that will be ready for use within a few years and has alreadybeen tested.

CJTFis based on NATO’s three operational headquarters

Theconcept that we are developing takes serving officers and civilians from theparent HQ, and deploys them to the operational mission with augmentees from awide range of nations.

Manynations have signed on to this concept and are already participating activelyin CJTF exercises. InNovember I participated in an exercise that involved 2400 troops from all NATOnations, plus 17 non-member nations. I had a deputy from Switzerland, one of our key staff officers wasAustrian and the deputy commander was a Finnish general. Experts from the Lester PearsonPeacekeeping Centre in Canada played the role of the UN, the North AtlanticCouncil and the warring parties in a very realistic test of the CJTFconcept. We trained together inFinland for a week, then deployed to Poland with a full communications and lifesupport system as if the area we were entering required a totally autonomousoperation.

Thereare many problems still to resolve, but this CJTF concept, perhaps linked tothe EU’s stated intent to form a deployable police force of over 5000officers, and following along the lines suggested by President Ahtisaari, maywell be the package solution to future requirements. And therein lies the dilemma on which I will end mypresentaiton. Within three years,the nations of the EAPC will be in a position to project a civil-militarypackage of forces anywhere. Thenext Rwanda may not present the excuse that it is too far away to riskintervention. Rather, adecisionwill have to be based on a moral and political judgment. I wonder if the politicians will thankus.