

Alliance Repercussions

or

How extended deterrence distorts US
nuclear planning and impedes steps
toward zero

or

With friends like these ...

Extended Deterrence

“The United States has extended its nuclear protective umbrella to 30-plus friends and allies as an expression of commitment and common purpose as well as a disincentive for proliferation.”

-- Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II Report, December 2008

Nuclear Umbrella

- No formal “nuclear umbrella” commitment
- Umbrella is expressed by ...
 - Public statements
 - Consultations and exercises
 - Physical basing of nuclear weapons in host countries
 - Dual-key arrangements

A Brief History *of*
Extended Deterrence ...



ircraft and missiles recommended for procurement in FY 1963 by
ce and the Polaris submarines recommended for procurement in
the Navy would cost approximately \$3.1 billion more to buy
ircraft and missiles I am recommending. Of this, approximately
s would require funding in FY 1962 and FY 1963.

as these forces, I will recommend at a later date that the
be authorized to procure and operate a secure command and control
SAC. Except for 20 KC-135's which will be available for use
e command posts, the cost of this system has not been included
ures on page 3.

al Basis for Force Level Recommendations

forces I am recommending have been chosen to provide the United
n the capability, in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, first,
back against Soviet bomber bases, missile sites, and other
ons associated with long-range nuclear forces, in order to reduce
er and limit the damage that can be done to us by vulnerable
low-on forces, while, second, holding in protected reserve forces
destroying the Soviet urban society, if necessary, in a controlled

By reducing to a minimum the possibility of a U.S. nuclear attack in response to Soviet aggression against our Allies, a "minimum deterrence" posture would weaken our ability to deter such Soviet attacks."

- a. Deterrence may fail, or war may break out for accidental or unintended reasons, and if it does, a capability to counter-attack against high-priority Soviet military targets can make a major contribution to the objectives of limiting damage and terminating the war on acceptable terms;
- b. By reducing to a minimum the possibility of a U. S. nuclear attack in response to Soviet aggression against our Allies, a "minimum deterrence" posture would weaken our ability to deter such Soviet attacks.



The Washington Post

January 27, 1977

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Nuclear 'Blockbuster'

At a closed-door meeting at Blair House late on the evening of Jan. 12, Jimmy Carter dropped a blockbuster on this nation's top national security officials that could imperil Western European independence.

He wanted immediate "studies" looking toward reduction of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal down to only 200 to 250 intercontinental mis-

Stunned, speechless, Gen. Brentnider, chairman of the Staff, stared at the man commander-in-chief. B. Brown, soon to become secretary, managed an answer "fident" (as described but under the circumsta-

Dr. Brown's reply: To immense reduction of A glc arsenal would be a f involving the most con-

dent questions of political and military strategy (even though the Soviet missiles would be simultaneously reduced).

Then, Gen. Brown (no relation to Harold) overcame his astonishment. Of course, he told Carter, the Joint Chiefs would immediately undertake necessary studies for a reduction to 200 to 250 long-range ballistic missiles, which Carter specified should all be submarine-launched. Not a word of caution escaped the general's lips.

Carter's order to Gen. Brown leaked from the Pentagon into the White House where President Ford was winding up his affairs. He was appalled, and so was Henry Kissinger. Both agreed to say nothing until the Carter national security policy has time to develop.

The Carter blockbuster, many national security experts believe, would presage the end of democratic Western Europe. It was dropped in the midst of

a tightly guarded military briefing just before the inauguration: A full report on the President's awesome responsibility in the case of threatened or surprise Soviet nuclear attack.

Known as the SIOC (Single Integrated Operations Command) briefing, the three-hour session took the President elect through possible contingencies on

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arms limitation (SALT) agreement based on a ceiling of 2,400 intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, of which 1,320 could be MIRVed.

Rough dimensions of a SALT II agreement along those lines were agreed to by Ford and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev at Vladivostok. A deal was never consummated, however, because of disagreement over how to treat the newly developed U.S. cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber, claimed by Moscow not to be intercontinental but believed by the United States to have intercontinental capability.

In ordering Gen. Brown to plot a free world defense based on only 200 to 250 submarine-launched missiles, Carter raises the following grave problems:

1. By radically limiting a nuclear re-

2002 Nuclear Posture Review


(1) Assure, (2) Dissuade, (3) Deter and (4) Defeat

- Assure: Parity with Russian Strategic Forces

- Dissuade: Several factors larger than the worst-case Chinese Nuclear Arsenal.

Special Case: NATO

- A “few hundred” US warheads deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey.
- The role of Turkey
- Out of sight, out of mind?
- Or just out of our minds?



Special Case: Japan

- Extended Deterrence and the Nuclear Allergy
- Six-months, a turn of the screw and other myths
- Japan's limited options

