


Why have some states opted for nuclear weapons while others have renounced them?



Cases included in the book:

Taiwan

Israel

Iran

Japan

Iraq

South Korea

North Korea

Egypt

Libya

Neorealism: Empirical anomalies

- **Acutely vulnerable states - not nuclear**
- **Rivals did not always respond in kind**
- **Too many “dogs that didn’t bark”**
- **Insecurity: Insufficient, Unnecessary?**
- **Hegemonic protection –different effects**
- **Hegemonic coercion – unsuccessful**
- **Hegemonic guarantees – insufficient**

Neorealism: Other problems

- **Fails to explain too many (crucial) cases**
- **Leads to multiple possible outcomes (cannot be falsified)**
- **States are not monolithic entities; internal architecture of states matters**
- **Alternative explanations fare better**
- **Overestimates state security, conflating it with *regime security***

More problems...

- ☒ The theory cannot be easily confirmed even *in its home turf* (hard core security)
- ☒ Does not explain the overwhelming majority of cases *with ease and at high levels of confidence*
- ☒ *Does not* effortlessly crowd out other theories

Domestic orientations to the global political-economy have important implications for nuclear paths

- **Leaders advocating economic growth through integration in the global economy (“internationalizers”) have incentives to avoid the costs of nuclearization**
- **By contrast, nuclearization implies fewer costs for “inward-looking” leaders and constituencies less dependent on international markets, investment, technology, and institutions**

Nuclear programs: allies of inward-looking coalitions

- Dense techno-industrial bureaucracy dwarfing other economic activities
- Beyond formal budgetary oversight
- Actual or imaginary output provides powerful source of nationalist myths

Hence,

Nuclear aspirants are more likely to emerge from domestic contexts dominated by inward-oriented leaders/regimes

(Contrast between East Asia and the Middle East)

In sum, domestic models are

- * Crucial, not afterthoughts or residuals**
- * Filters through which leaders define security**

Domestic models explain

- * Different domestic actors' nuclear preferences
- * Why nuclear policies within states may vary over time
- * Why different states vary in compliance
- * Why some security dilemmas are more intractable
- * Why some states rank alliances higher than self-reliance, or vice-versa
- * Why nuclear weapons' programs surfaced where security hardly justified them
- * Why they were avoided where one might have expected them

Domestic models

- * Prevent the frequent overestimation of *state security* as source of nuclear behavior
- * Avoid the underestimation of *regime security* as crucial driver
- * Provides a better foundation for policy