

ethical and IHL issues in military robotics proliferation, autonomy and prohibition


ISODARCO january 2013

Noel Sharkey
University Sheffield UK
ICRAC



“Are you attacking from home today honey”

PAUL
NOTH



UAV, UCAV, RPA, drone



MQ-1 PREDATOR WITH HELLFIRE (USAF)



UAV, UCAV, RPA, drone



perceived accuracy

expansion of the battlespace

moral buffer?





TBIJ CIA Drone Strike statistics

Pakistan 2004–2013 strikes: **359** killed: **2625-3440**

Obama strikes: **307**

civilians killed: **473-889**

Children killed: 176

injured: **1264-1424**

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Yemen 2002–2013

strikes: **70-86** killed: **374-1077**

Civilians killed: **72-171**

Children killed: 27-35

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Somalia 2007 – 2013 strikes: **10-23** killed: **58-170**

Civilians killed: **11-57**

Children killed: 1-3

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are Drone attacks now action short of war?

will they lower the threshold for war?





"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it."

Robert E. Lee, at Fredericksburg

2. Proliferation

driven by commercial interest

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
driven by commercial interest

countries developing
and/or

purchasing military robots

proliferation of military UAVs

proliferation of military UAVs









Length: **29.5 feet**
 Range: **2,485.5 miles**
 Maximum speed: **174 mph**
 Maximum altitude: **16,404 feet**

翼龙

Yilong (Pterodactyl)

This medium-sized, propeller-driven drone is China's answer to the U.S. Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones – with a similar V-tail configuration. Its manufacturer, Aviation Industry Corp., says the Yilong has undergone test flights and is now the only drone being freely sold on the international market that can be used for both reconnaissance and strikes.

Xianglong (Soaring Dragon)


Produced by Aviation Industry Corp., this is the Chinese version of the U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk – an advanced, high-altitude, long-duration drone designed for reconnaissance. The main difference is that the Xianglong has only a fraction of the Global Hawk's range; its manufacturer says it is intended for operations limited to the Asia/Pacific region.



Length: **45.9 feet**
 Range: **4,660 miles**
 Max. speed: **466 mph**
 Max. altitude: **57,000 feet**

翔龙

暗剑



Length: **Unknown**
 Range: **Unknown**
 Max. speed: **Unknown**
 Max. altitude: **Unknown**

Anjian (Dark Sword)

This conceptual model generated huge buzz when unveiled by Shenyang Aircraft Co. in 2006 because it represents the aspirations of the Chinese to design something even Western powers don't have yet – a supersonic drone capable of air-to-air combat as well as ground strikes. No one knows whether it can really be achieved and how far along in development the model is.

“The United States doesn’t export many attack drones, so we’re taking advantage of that hole in the market”

Zhang Qiaoliang, Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute,



Current Export Restrictions

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTRC)

34 countries (informal and voluntary)

restricts *export* of UAVs capable of carrying a payload of 500 kilos at least 300 kilometers

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US: International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)

Current Export Restrictions

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US: International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)

September 6 2012 easing of restriction to allow US sales of drones to 66 unspecified countries



from Russia with love



US MAARS

USAF roadmap 2009-2047

USAF roadmap 2009-2047

Man-**in**-the-loop

progresses to

Man-**on**-the-loop



Will we entirely automate warfare one day?

what does autonomy mean?

what does autonomy mean?

- * takeoff and landing
- * navigation
- * obstacle avoidance
- * object classification
- * target location & selection

autonomous decision making

autonomous decision making

IF vehicle in GPS specified region

AND


heat signature detected

THEN

select target and release weapon


why autonomy?

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
signal jamming



why autonomy?

signal jamming

deep mission capability




why autonomy?

signal jamming

deep mission capability

less expensive




why autonomy?

signal jamming

deep mission capability

less expensive

pace of battle



why autonomy?


signal jamming

deep mission capability

less expensive

pace of battle

air to air combat



robots to decide



robots to decide



robots to decide

Autonomous warfighting robots are high on
the agenda of all US forces

robots to decide

Autonomous warfighting robots are high on
the agenda of all US forces

*"The lawyers tell me there are no
prohibitions against robots making life-or-
death decisions"*

Gordon Johnson
Joint Forces Command at the Pentagon
New York Times 2005

robots to decide

Autonomous warfighting robots are high on
the agenda of all US forces

Think of TACs as moveable ordinance, mobile mines – they can
draw fire and perform kamikaze missions

Gordon Johnson
Joint Forces Command at the Pentagon
New York Times 2005




sky NEWS

17:42

NLA

BP WAITING TO SEE IF NEW CONTAINMENT CAP WILL CAPTURE



Artist's concept of the ACTUV in action (Image: DARPA)

DARPA

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), McLean, Virginia

Phase 1 completed - Phase 2 underway

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CONTINUOUS TRAIL UNMANNED VESSEL

CAN YOU COME UP WITH A WAY TO KEEP TRACK OF ELUSIVE SUBMARINES THAT HAS NEVER BEEN THOUGHT OF BEFORE?

CAN YOU OUTSMART AN ENEMY SUBMARINE COMMANDER AND KEEP HIM FROM ESCAPING INTO THE DEEP?

DOWNLOAD AND PLAY THE ACTUV TACTICS SIMULATOR AND SUBMIT YOUR RESULTS TO DARPA TO HELP DEVELOP THE FUTURE OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE.

DOWNLOAD NOW: [DARPA ACTUV Game.zip](#)

the crusher



weight: 7 tons

speed: 25mph

sight: 2.5 miles

fully autonomous capability

the crusher



weight: 7 tons

speed: 25mph

sight: 2.5 miles

fully autonomous capability

27

The laws of war jus in bello

The laws of war jus in bello

1. Principle of Distinction
2. Principle of Proportionality
3. Accountability



**Made by IAI for Turkish,
Korean,
Chinese and Indian Armies**

**Autonomous Harpy radar
killer**





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robots cannot reason

robots cannot be proportionate

robots cannot be proportionate

easy proportionality problem

robots cannot be proportionate

easy proportionality problem

hard proportionality problem

situational awareness

Who is accountable and responsible for mishaps?

Who is accountable and responsible for mishaps?



robots cannot discriminate
robots cannot be proportionate
robots cannot reason
robots cannot be held accountable

The accelerating pace of battle

The accelerating pace of battle



The accelerating pace of battle



The accelerating pace of battle



HTV-2 tested at Mach 22
13,000mph (20,921.5kph)



The accelerating pace of battle



HTV-2 tested at Mach 22
13,000mph (20,921.5kph)



Who knows how all of the complex algorithms will interact?

Interaction of complex algorithms

Interaction of complex algorithms

AMAZON: The Making of a Fly \$50 + \$3.99 shipping

Profnath v Borderbooks

Interaction of complex algorithms

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Profnath: 0.998 times highest price

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\$23,698,655.93

will autonomous lethal targeting be used
ready or not?

will autonomous lethal targeting be used
ready or not?

incremental functionality

will autonomous lethal targeting be used
ready or not?

incremental functionality

it will depend on who else uses it -

military necessity

'robust' self defence

Prohibition or control?

Prohibition or control?

CCW

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (eg blinding laser weapons)

Article 36

The study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.

re-purposing: making it hard to stop ALT



MQ-1 PREDATOR WITH HELLFIRE (USAF)

re-purposing:

re-purposing:



re-purposing:



re-purposing:



International Court of Justice Nuclear Advisory Opinion

International Court of Justice

Nuclear Advisory Opinion

The Court ruled that, in the current state of international law and given the facts at its disposal, it was not possible to conclude definitively whether the threat or use of **nuclear weapons** would be lawful or unlawful in extreme circumstances of self-defence (circumstances in which the very survival of the defending State would be at stake)

International Court of Justice

Nuclear Advisory Opinion

The Court ruled that, in the current state of international law and given the facts at its disposal, it was not possible to conclude definitively whether the threat or use of **Autonomous Robot Weapons** would be lawful or unlawful in extreme circumstances of self-defence (circumstances in which the very survival of the defending State would be at stake)

US DoD directive 21 Nov 2012

US DoD directive 21 Nov 2012

failures "can result from a number of causes, including, but not limited to, human error, human-machine interaction failures, malfunctions, communications degradation, software coding errors, enemy cyber attacks or infiltration into the industrial supply chain, jamming, spoofing, decoys, other enemy countermeasures or actions, or unanticipated situations on the battlefield".

Human Rights Watch Report, Nov 19 2012

all states:

prohibit the development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons through an international legally binding instrument;

adopt national laws and policies to prohibit the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons.

in conclusion

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automating war could lower the threshold for war

automating war could kill more civilians

- robots cannot discriminate

- robots cannot be proportionate

- robots cannot reason

- robots cannot be held accountable

automating war could create more terrorism

automating war could extend targeted killings

we have no idea how these systems will interact

www.icrac.net

thank you for listening

 StopTheRobotWar

Unmanned Nuclear Bomber!

Adam B. Lowther
USAF
June 17, 2009

