

Strategic Issues for NATO Today

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NATO since 1990

- Emphasis since end of Cold War:
 - Enlargement—12 new members since 1999
 - Partnerships—41 formal partners in 4 categories, including PfP, MD, ICI, global partners
 - Out of area missions—Balkans, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya
 - *Not* collective defense or Article 5
- Assumptions during this period
 - No threat from within Europe
 - Light expeditionary forces enough
 - Opportunity to cut and save
- Today a global Alliance with wide array of concerns and responsibilities
 - Avoid the Swiss army knife syndrome



Strategic Considerations

- Challenge of balancing three core tasks, especially after Ukraine crisis
 - Collective defense
 - Crisis management
 - Cooperative security
- Accommodating different threat perceptions between member states
- Determining appropriate mix of weapons (conv, nuc, MD) to accomplish all three tasks—especially collective defense
- Preparing for different types of conflict:
 - Wars of necessity (e.g. Article 5)
 - Wars of choice
- Defining better burden-sharing relationships
- Determining agreed way to deal with Russia
- Dealing with US “pivot” away from Europe




Wales Summit

- No desire to return to a cold war
- No desire to appear provocative to Russia
- The longest communique in NATO history barely mentions deterrence
 - No mention at all of European based DCA or NSNW
- Several new initiatives regarding Russia and nonlinear warfare—mostly for conventional forces:
 - Readiness Action Plan (RAP) using the Connected Forces Initiative
 - Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) within NATO Response Force (NRF)
 - Increased readiness and capabilities at HQ Multinational Corps Northeast (Poland)
 - Framework Nations Concept
 - Support to Ukraine through Distinctive
 - Partnership Interoperability Program
 - Defense and Related Security Capacity initiative
 - Bolster cyber security
 - Increased and enhanced exercises
 - Rotational basing in NE Europe



Divided NATO

- Despite summit initiatives, most NATO members lack any sense of urgency to counter Russian moves in the East
 - Much less NATO conventional capability in Europe than in past
 - Most NATO members feel no need to increase defense spending
 - No interest in nuclear deterrence
 - Potential effect on Alliance solidarity?



NATO Nuclear Policy

- “Political weapons”
 - Purpose: deter aggression against Alliance
 - Ultimate security insurance policy
- Three nuclear weapons member states: US, UK, FR
- Nuclear Planning Group and High Level Group meet at 27 (all but France)
- 2012 DDPR: status quo is NATO’s preferred option
 - DCA, dual-key, risk- and burden-sharing
- Reduced reliance on nuclear forces
 - Steady and significant reductions in number of systems, number of warheads, and readiness levels since end of Cold War
 - No peacetime contingency plans
 - No adversary, so no pre-designated targets
 - “The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.”



Future of Deterrence

- Deterrence of attack in Europe since 1949
- Deterrence requirements are changing
 - Impact of Ukrainian crisis
 - Impact of hybrid warfare
 - Role of Alliance in defending Partners
 - Importance of reassuring New Members
- Major decisions regarding NSNW future in Europe:
 - Political: will US warheads be allowed to remain
 - Procurement: dual-key arrangements based on allied DCA but aging fleets
- Reconsideration of “appropriate mix” of forces
 - Conventional, missile defenses, nuclear
 - Declining capabilities of conventional forces
 - Missile defense have no role in hybrid warfare
 - Logically, this implies an *increased* role for nuclear forces—but no interest by most allies



Michael Ammons, U.S. Air Force/Getty Images

Ballistic Missile Defenses

- European Phased Adaptive Approach
 - Agreed 2002
 - IOC announced at NATO Chicago Summit 2012
 - Obama cancelled Phase IV as part of “reset” with Moscow
 - Includes AEGIS at sea (Spain), land-based early warning (Turkey), and eventually AEGIS-Ashore (first fired by the Romanian, 2015)
- Wales Summit *did* emphasize BMD and continuation of its development
 - Part of appropriate mix of forces for Alliance
 - Russian actions in Eastern Europe since 2014 guaranteed deployment of all three phases



Arms Control

- Russia has abrogated, withdrawn, or no longer recognizes several Cold War treaties:
 - CFE—Russia stopped complying a decade ago
 - INF—US claims Russia has violated this with cruise missile testing
 - Helsinki Final Act—aggression against neighbor
 - Open Skies Treaty—selective implementation
- Moscow still officially abiding by strategic level New START Treaty
 - Bilateral relations continuing at strategic level
- But no movement toward new negotiations
 - Required by New START, US Senate ratification, DDPR
 - Follow-on to New START should include discussions on non-strategic nuclear weapons



Conclusion

- Wales Summit saw multiple initiatives and commitments in a communique approved by consensus
 - No desire to return to a cold war
 - No desire to appear provocative to Russia
 - But recognized need to:
 - Secure NATO's borders
 - Assure allies & partners
- Conclusion: concern, but not yet alarm
 - Few allies willing to seriously think about what it means to be a nuclear Alliance
 - Arms control efforts have stalled
 - NATO and Russia are not speaking
 - Nobody younger than colonel remembers the Cold War
 - Alliance must tread very carefully to avoid returning to that relationship—or creating rifts from the debate
 - But cold war still better than hybrid conflict

