Mike Moore
RMA andSpace Weaponization. From force enhancement to global engagement
The revolutionin military affairs is heavily dependent on a wide variety of intelligence,reconnaissance, communication, and navigation satellites. Although theycan be viewed as components of weapons systems, they are not in themselvesweapons.
But in recentyears, the United States has been developing plans to take control of space,for "deterrence" and "defensive" purposes. At a minimum, that would involveanti-satellite weapons. The United States is also developing concepts forputting actual weapons into orbit -- anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons.Beyond that, it speaks of orbiting weapons that could someday disable ordestroy earthly targets.
So far,the United States has made no definitive moves to deploy space-based weapons.Weaponizing space is not now national policy. But the current administrationseems receptive to the idea. Indeed, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeldis perhaps the nation's strongest and most influential advocate of weaponizingspace.
We shallexplore the international political implications of a U.S. move to takecontrol of space and possibly to weaponize it. Does any one nation havethe right to control near-earth space? Is near-earth space indeed the commonproperty of humankind? Or is it just another potential medium of warfare,like land, sea, and air?
ContributedPaper:
Space Cop
America'scoming war with its own values
Mike Moore
SeniorEditor
The Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists
August2002
Forat least a generation, highly placed people in the White House, in theDefense Department, and in many hard-line think tanks have believed thatfuture conflicts will not be confined to land, sea, and air. Space, theysay, will inevitably become the "fourth medium of warfare." Battles willbe fought in space and from space. The United States had better wake upto that fact and take charge.
In1997, U.S. Space Command, an umbrella organization headquartered in ColoradoSprings, issued its 16-page Vision for 2020. Printed on glossy, heavyweightpaper and heavily stocked with full-color illustrations, Vision is ratherlike a prospectus for a gated retirement community in Florida, the sortof thing typically peppered with punchy paragraphs and salted with bromidesthat describe the development's unparalleled amenities.
Butinstead of depicting a proposed championship golf course, tennis courts,pools, and clubhouses, Vision offers dreams of unlimited spacepower. Onthe first page, in oversize type against the black background of space,we read: "U.S. Space Command -- dominating the space dimension of militaryoperations to protect U.S. interests and investment. Integrating SpaceForces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict."The type, a brilliant yellow, seems to fall away from the reader, muchlike the beginning of George Lukas's first Star Wars movie. ("A long timeago, in a galaxy far, far away. . . .")
Theillustration on the inside back cover of Vision punctuates the Lukas-likeStar Wars theme. Our vantage point is near-Earth space, a few hundred milesup. Below is a pie-wedge portion of the Earth, depicted in the sere sepiashades of a desert landscape. We see the easternmost tip of the MediterraneanSea and below it, the Red Sea, partly obscured by clouds. Above the Mediterraneanis a bit of the Black Sea; to its right, the Caspian; below that, the PersianGulf.
Therest of the painting is bluish-black space, speckled with stars. An orbitinglaser dominates the foreground. It glows orange as it zaps a target onthe Iraqi-Iranian border. Does the laser-induced explosion represent anascending missile? Probably. A terrestrial bunker? Possibly. The artisticevidence is ambiguous. But the didactic point is not: Space Command meansto dominate space if it ever gets a thumbs-up from the White House. ("Thetwo principal themes of the USSPACECOM Vision," says a bit of centerfoldtext, "are dominating the space medium and integrating space power throughoutmilitary operations.")
Visionwas a preview. The following year Space Command issued its 90-page LongRange Plan, a document of at least middling importance that seems to havebeen little noticed in the United States. One supposes, though, that theplan has been read and dissected in most world capitals. Governmental officialsand military officers everywhere have a keen interest in trying to figureout what the United States will do next. The Long Range Plan is helpfulin that regard.
Likemilitaries everywhere, Space Command is accustomed to the rigors of worst-caseanalyses. The glass is always half empty and probably cracked. But in thereasonably near future, all sorts of adversaries -- national military forces,paramilitary units, and terrorists -- would acquire sophisticated spacecapabilities, the plan says. Enemies "may very well know, in near realtime, the disposition of all [U.S.] forces. They will command and controltheir forces with real-time access to precise navigation (position andtiming), submeter imagery, highly accurate weather data, timely missilewarning, and robust communications." Hostile forces will "share the highground of space with the United States and its allies."
Technologiesavailable in the global marketplace will help these bad actors developantisatellite weapons, the plan says. Wealthy states will probably optfor directed-energy weapons, such as lasers, to attack U.S. space assets."Lesser powers" may prefer to jam signals or disable command-and-controlsystems and intelligence operations with cyber attacks on U.S. computersystems.
Theplan's authors peered into their crystal ball and everywhere saw darkness.Losing the use of space in a future conflict, they said, would be "intolerable."Taking control of space would require systematic effort and heavy investment;it would be neither easy nor cheap. But it would be necessary. By 2020,the United States would have a "robust and wholly integrated suite of capabilitiesin space and on the ground" and it would have achieved "dominance of space,"thus ensuring that U.S. military and commercial interests would be protected.
TheUnited States was in a moment of "strategic pause," said the plan. TheCold War was history and no "peer competitor" would appear on the horizonfor at least 20 years. It was a good time to explore "innovative warfightingconcepts and capabilities." Like airpower before, spacepower would progressfrom its current role of supporting warfighters "toward space combat operations."Eventually, "as it continues to mature, it may allow us to project forcefrom space to Earth" -- in plain English, to attack earthly targets fromspace.
Spacecontrol was defined in the Long Range Plan as "the ability to assure accessto space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an abilityto deny others the use of space, if required." Beyond space control, theplan said, lies "global engagement" -- "holding a finite number of targetsat risk anywhere, anytime with nearly instantaneous attack from space-basedassets."
TheLong Range Plan is one of many Defense Department "vision statements,"all of which are variations on a universal Defense Department theme: Asthe United States moves into the 21st Century, "the emerging synergy ofspace superiority -- equal to land-, sea-, and air-superiority -- willenable [the United States] to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance."
Fullspectrum dominance, as outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is invariablysaid to be about deterrence, not war. Although the Defense Department saysthe United States will be prepared to fight and win battles anywhere inthe world, it also suggests that such a capability is likely to dissuadebad actors from starting a military row with the United States (or itsallies) in the first place.
"Informationdominance" is the key to full spectrum dominance. (The Defense Departmenthas an almost mystical devotion to the word "dominance.") And space assetsare the key to information dominance. A sample scenario, from Air ForceSpace Command's Master Plan for 2020:
In a few decades, the Air Force "might have an array of 'hyperspectral'sensors on Earth and in space capable of seeing, hearing, and telling abouteverything a potential enemy is doing." It "will likely dominate the airand space around the world, using Earth and space-borne hypersonic vehiclesto transport equipment and people anywhere quickly." It would be able to"fight intense, decisive wars with great precision, hitting hard whileavoiding collateral damage in both 'real' space and in computer cyberspace."
Thisfuture Air Force would "be better able to monitor and shape world events"because of its sheer omnipresence. "Space forces complement the physicalpresence of terrestrial forces. Although they are not visible from theground, space forces provide virtual presence through their ability tosupply global mobility, control the high ground, support versatile combatcapability, ensure information dominance, and sustain deterrence."
Indeed,according the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, workingseamlessly together "will be persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminentin any form of conflict." Control of space -- the "ultimate high ground"-- will be, as social-worker jargon might describe it, "the enabler."
The goalof all Americans
Takingthe high ground of space is hardly a new idea. Consider the March22, 1952 issue of Collier's magazine, then a widely read and influentialU.S. publication.
Thecover was a painting of a winged spaceplane, rocket engines ablaze, burstinginto the darkness of space miles above earth's day/night boundary. Insidewas an article by Wernher von Braun, the Nazi scientist who had developedV-2 missiles during the war, more than 3,000 of which were sent towardLondon and Antwerp.
By1952, von Braun was America's leading rocketman and he was suggesting thatthe United States build a slowly rotating "wheel-shaped satellite" 250feet in diameter that would circle the Earth every two hours at an altitudeof 1,075 miles.
"Fromthis platform, a trip to the moon itself will be just a step, as scientistsreckon distance in space," said von Braun. Mars would be next.
Besidesadvancing science in general and space travel in particular, the satellitewould also ensure world peace. Technicians "using specially designed, powerfultelescopes attached to large optical screens, radarscopes, and cameras"would "keep under constant inspection every ocean, continent, country,and city. . . . It will be practically impossible for any nation to hidewarlike preparations for any length of time."
Withits space platform, the United States could become the world's policeman,armed with atom bombs instead of riot clubs. If a nation threatened worldpeace, "small winged rocket missiles with atomic warheads could be launchedfrom the station in such a manner that they would strike their targetsat supersonic speeds. By simultaneous radar tracking of both missile andtarget, these atomic-headed rockets could be accurately guided to any spoton the Earth."
Whatcountry would go to war with a U.S. friend or ally, thus risking retaliationfrom Uncle Sam's 24-hour-a-day space patrol?
VonBraun had been promoting such ideas since May 1945, when his Peenemunderocket team surrendered to American forces in Bavaria. But he never quitesold the vision of atom bombs in space to the White House, in part becausethe Truman and Eisenhower administrations were reasonably content withthe nuclear deterrence afforded by America's long-range bombers. But itwas on President Eisenhower's watch that space weapons finally became ahot issue.
OnOctober 4, 1957, Sputnik Zemlyi -- "traveling companion of the world" --became the first manmade Earth satellite. Sputnik weighed just 184.3 poundsbut its A-flat beeps were heard around the world. Sputnik II followed inNovember; it weighed half a ton. To accelerate payloads like that to 17,500miles per hour, the minimum necessary to achieve orbit, implied that theSoviets had powerful rockets that could also lob hydrogen bombs towardthe United States.
Indeed,the Soviet Union had been boasting of such a capability since August 26of that year, when it announced the successful test of a "a super long-distanceintercontinental multi-stage ballistic missile" that covered "a huge distancein a brief time." It was now possible, the Soviet statement said, "to directmissiles into any part of the world."
Sovietbluster aside -- the Soviet Union did not have that capability and neverdeveloped it -- the military implications of Sputnik unnerved millionsof people in the United States. The director of the Smithsonian AstrophysicalObservatory said, "I would not be surprised if the Russians reached themoon within a week." When asked what we might find on the moon, EdwardTeller answered, "Russians." The New York Times declared that the UnitedStates was "in a race for survival." Labor leader Walter Reuther calledSputnik a "bloodless Pearl Harbor." Lyndon B. Johnson, majority leaderof the Senate, said, "Soon, they will be dropping bombs on us from spacelike kids dropping rocks onto cars from freeway overpasses."
G.Mennen Williams, governor of Michigan, resorted to edgy humor: Oh LittleSputnik, flying high/ With made-in-Moscow beep,/ You tell the world it'sa Commie sky,/ And Uncle Sam's asleep.
AfterSputnik, President Eisenhower, on whose watch the first Sputniks chirped,named James R. Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technologyand possibly the most respected scientist-administrator of the day, ashis chief science adviser. "It is strange now to recall the fantasies thatSputnik inspired in the minds of many able military officers," Killianlater recalled. "It cast a spell that caused otherwise rational commandersreally to become romantic about space. No sir, they were not going to fightthe next war with the weapons of the last war; the world was going to becontrolled from the high ground of space."
Itis likely that Killian was thinking mostly of Thomas D. White, chief ofstaff of the Air Force. On November 29, 1957, White began a public crusadeto get the Air Force into space when he outlined the importance of air-and spacepower at the National Press Club in Washington, a forum that ensuredmaximum attention from the press.
"Thecompelling reason for the preeminence of airpower is clear and unchallenged,because those who have the capability to control the air are in a positionto exert control over the land and seas beneath." But now, he suggested,the Soviet Union had one-upped the United States. For the first time since1814, the U.S. homeland was in mortal danger; no longer would the Atlanticand Pacific moats protect it. America's answer to the Soviet challengewould require the military use of space.
"Afew minutes ago, I stated the concept that whoever has the capability tocontrol the air is in a position to exert control over the land and seasbeneath. I feel in the future whoever has the capability to control spacewill likewise possess the capability to exert control of the surface ofthe Earth."
Thefollowing February, White elaborated his vision in a speech at the nationalconference of the Air Force Association:
"The United States," said White, "must win and maintain the capabilityto control space in order to assure the progress and preeminence of thefree nations. If liberty and freedom are to remain in the world, the UnitedStates and its allies must be in a position to control space. We cannotpermit the dominance of space by those who have repeatedly stated theyintend to crush the free world.
"Youwill note that I stated the United States must win and maintain the capabilityto control space. I did not say that we should control space. There isan important distinction here. We want all nations to join with us in suchmeasures as are necessary to ensure that outer space shall never be usedfor any but peaceful purposes.
"Butuntil effective measures to this end are assured, our possession of sucha capability will guarantee the free nations liberty -- it does not connotedenial of the benefits of space to others. In the past when control ofthe seas was exercised by peaceful nations, people everywhere profited.Likewise, as long as the United States maintains the capability to controlspace, the entire world will reap the benefits that accrue."
Controlof space, said White, "should be the goal of all Americans."
Onedid not need to be a rocket scientist -- and presumably most such scientistsin the United States and elsewhere quickly became aware of White's words-- to parse the general's argument. Like von Braun, White believed theUnited States should become the world's space cop.
A Januspolicy
PresidentEisenhower avoided going down that road. Eisenhower believed that weaponizingspace was a profoundly dangerous idea for the American people and for thepeople of the world. Space should be reserved for peaceful purposes, hesaid. Intelligence-gathering satellites were justified, even necessaryif the United States and the Soviet Union were not to blunder into war,and he initiated a top-secret spy-satellite program that we now know as"CORONA." But weapons in space were out.
Eisenhower'speaceful-purposes principle has been greatly compromised over the decades.Beginning in the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union militarizedthe regions of space nearest the Earth with a bewildering variety of satellitesthat go far beyond intelligence gathering, the mission Eisenhower was mostinterested in. Today -- and mostly for the United States -- satelliteshave become inseparable components of many terrestrial "weapons systems."
Overthe years, presidential administrations have waxed and waned in their enthusiasmfor a possible space cop role. After Eisenhower left office, an ever-renewingcore of Air Force officers lobbied their colleagues in the Defense Departmentand their friends in Congress, the press, conservative think tanks, andthe aerospace industry to push for space control.
By1996, the National Space Policy of the United States had steadily evolvedto the point that it instructed the Defense Department to maintain thecapability to "execute the mission areas" of space control and force application.The latter included having the capability to strike terrestrial targetsfrom space.
Space-controlpartisans frequently allege that the space-control and force-applicationlanguage in U.S. National Space Policy is bogus -- window dressing at bestand dangerously hypocritical at worst. Steven Lambakis, a senior analystat the National Institute for Public Policy and among the most persuasiveof spacepower champions, compares current U.S. policy on military spaceto Janus, the two-faced god of Roman mythology.
Oneface, Lambakis says, seems to suggest that space ought to be consideredas a "full-blown, war-fighting environment." But Janus's other face "regardsspace as a peaceful preserve, a sanctuary that man must not despoil, anarena where military activities may lead to unanticipated provocation anddreadful consequences for security and international affairs."
Lambakisis right regarding the contradictions of U.S. military space policy. Althoughit tells the Defense Department to "develop, operate, and maintain spacecontrol capabilities," the armed forces have not done so because of mixedsignals from successive presidential administrations. National policy regardingspace control and force application has been mostly words and few deeds,as if a big-city police department had been charged with keeping the peacebut enjoined from carrying firearms.
"Wehave reached a mysterious conceptual void," writes Lambakis, "where weapply different rules to space. . . . The world fully expects the UnitedStates to throw its weight around when its interests are threatened --except, apparently, with respect to space."
A spacePearl Harbor
OnJanuary 11 of last year, a report from a blue-ribbon "Space Commission"established by Congress was issued. The commission was sharply criticalof the failure of the United States to take bold action to protect U.S.military, intelligence, and commercial interests in space.
TheUnited States must achieve the military capability, the commission said,"to use space as an integral part of its ability to manage crises, deterconflicts and, if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict." The reportalso contained these stunning words, said to have been drafted by the chairmanof the commission, Donald Rumsfeld:
Historyis replete with instances in which warning signs were ignored and changeresisted until an external, 'improbable' event forced resistant bureaucraciesto take action. The question is whether the U.S. will be wise enough toact responsibly and soon enough to reduce U.S. space vulnerability. Orwhether, as in the past, a disabling attack against the country and itspeople -- a 'Space Pearl Harbor' -- will be the only event able to galvanizethe nation and cause the U.S. government to act.
Weare on notice, but we have not noticed.
MostAmericans failed to read or hear the Pearl Harbor warning, mostly becausethe news media blew it. That's understandable. Distinguished panels, commissions,and task forces are common in Washington. They meet, hear witnesses, andissue staff-written reports that are, with rare exception, filed in drawerslabeled "Obscurity," where they sit for what passes for an eternity unlessrescued years later by historians who pronounce them "prescient" or "short-sighted"or "alarmist."
Thereport of the Space Commission (in full, the Commission to Assess UnitedStates National Security Space Management and Organization) followed thatpattern. The Associated Press distributed a nuts-and-bolts piece aboutit and the New York Times, the Washington Post and few other newspaperscarried short staff-written articles. TV news essentially ignored it.
Whydidn't a report with such headline-friendly rhetoric attract more attention?Bad timing. On December 28, 2000, after the commission's report was completed,president-elect George W. Bush nominated Rumsfeld as secretary of defense.In a peculiar coincidence, Rumsfeld's confirmation hearing before the SenateArmed Services Committee was January 11, 2001, the same day the Space Commission'sreport had been scheduled for release. Rumsfeld's testimony during thehearing focused on how he would reshape the military to meet the challengesof the 21st Century. That was the Rumsfeld story of the day. The findingsand recommendations of Rumsfeld's Space Commission were buried, sidebarmaterial at best.
The moneyshot
TheSpace Commission's report deserved more vigorous treatment than Rumsfeld'spro forma comments at the confirmation hearing. His remarks at the senatorialhearing were so conventional that they might have come from any nominee,even a Democrat. In contrast, the Space Commission's report was startling.Among other things, it spoke of taking control of space and placing weaponsin space. In a nod to those Americans who might not be enamored of suchideas, Rumsfeld's Space Commission simply said:
TheCommissioners appreciate the sensitivity that surrounds the notion of weaponsin space for offensive or defensive purposes. They also believe, however,that to ignore the issue would be a disservice to the nation. The Commissionersbelieve that the U.S. Government should vigorously pursue the capabilitiescalled for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the President willhave the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to and, ifnecessary, defend against attacks on the U.S. interests.
TheSpace Commission's report leaves little room for doubt as to the commissioners'meaning: It is time to abandon the Janus policy of talking tough whilesmiling sweetly. The United States should get on with the space cop mission.
Highon the commission's priority list was developing and testing a varietyof antisatellite weapons, largely because the commissioners believed thatunfriendly nations could deploy observation and command-and-control satellitesthat would someday imperil U.S. forces on land, sea, and air.
"Thesenior political and military leadership needs to test these [ASAT] capabilitiesin exercises on a regular basis, both to keep the armed forces proficientin their use and to bolster their deterrent value." By "test," the commissionersmeant computer simulations, war games -- and "live-fire events." The latterwould require "testing ranges in space."
TheUnited States, the commission said, also needs "assured access to space."Although space-launch facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Californiaand Cape Canaveral Air Force Base and the Kennedy Space Flight Center inFlorida were sufficient "to meet the projected needs of all users undernormal conditions," the United States should develop the capacity for "surges."That is, if U.S. satellites are attacked, the United States would needto quickly get replacement satellites into orbit.
Further,the United States "needs to develop better ways to conduct operations oncein space," such as on-orbit servicing of satellites. The Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency, the Air Force, and NASA were already studyingrobotic microsatellites that could service spacecraft, the commissionerssaid.
Thenation must build a more sophisticated "space situational awareness" network,not only to keep track of satellites, space debris, and asteroids but "toreduce the possibility of surprise by hostile actors." Radars and camerasused to track objects in space are now based on Earth. In the future, the"evolution of technology and the character of this problem argue for placingelements of the surveillance network in space."
Onecan scarcely argue with the importance of "space situational awareness."Errant space debris can kill. But "Earth surveillance from space," anotherbig-ticket item on the Space Commission's agenda, edges into Big Brotherterritory. "The U.S. needs to develop technologies for sensors, communication,power generation, and space platforms that will enable it to observe theEarth and objects in motion on a near real-time basis, 24-hours a day.If deployed, these could revolutionize military operations."
Space-basedradar aimed toward the Earth, the commissioners explained, "could providemilitary commanders, on a near-continuous and global basis, with timely,precise information on the location of adversary forces and their movementover time." That ability, "coupled to precision strike weapons deliveredrapidly over long distances," would give the United States a potent newweapon to deter "hostile action."
TheUnited States should also develop a "Global Information Grid," accordingto the commissioners, an "interconnected, end-to-end set of informationcapabilities and associated processes that will allow the warfighter, policymakers, and support personnel to access information on demand." The gridwould have ground-based and space-based components.
Asfor the endlessly controversial matter of national missile defense, thecommissioners turned cagey, presumably because it was still national policywhen the committee met to preserve (with modifications) the 1972 Anti-BallisticMissile Treaty. The report simply said: "Some believe the ballistic missiledefense mission is best performed when both sensors and interceptors aredeployed in space. Effective sensors make countermeasures more difficult,and interceptors make it possible to destroy a missile shortly after launch,before either warhead or countermeasures are released."
Andthen came the Space Commission's money shot:
Finally,space offers advantages for basing systems intended to affect air, land,and sea operations. Many think of space only as a place for passive collectionof images or signals or a switchboard that can quickly pass informationback and forth over long distances. It is also possible to project powerthrough and from space in response to events anywhere in the world. Unlikeweapons from aircraft, land forces, or ships, space missions initiatedfrom Earth or space could be carried out with little transit, information,or weather delay. Having this capability would give the U.S. a much strongerdeterrent and, in a conflict, an extraordinary military advantage.
The securitydilemma
Theapparent compulsion to further militarize space, as outlined by U.S. SpaceCommand and Rumsfeld's Space Commission, is puzzling. After all, the UnitedStates no longer has to worry about the Soviet Union, which for much ofits life was more of an "evil empire" than traditional liberals like toadmit. But today the Russian "threat" is more ephemeral than real, a leftoverphantasm of the Cold War. Even if the United States and Russia are notyet bosom buddies, they cooperate in a host of ways, even to the pointof hosting and toasting, with whisky and vodka, high-level delegationsfrom one another's militaries.
Thecountry most cherished by the American right as the Next Great Threat isChina. But unlike the former Soviet Union, China gives little indicationof wanting to carve out an alternate universe, a Never-Never land whereMarxist theology finally can be made to work, especially if enough retrogradecitizens are imprisoned or "re-educated."
Beijinglearned much from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the principal lessonbeing that in a Cold War-style competition, the United States wins. China'snational government may be corrupt, breathtakingly unimaginative, and brutallyrepressive in many parts of the country, but it understands that free enterprisewith "Chinese characteristics" is its future.
Chinamay aspire to regional economic hegemony, which could be bad news for Japan,a unified Korea, Indonesia, and surely Taiwan, China's "renegade province"that acts as if it were a de facto state. But China does not seem intenton wasting scarce resources in an effort to compete missile-for-missilewith the United States. Even the attempt to do so would drive it towardSoviet-style bankruptcy.
Tobe sure, China is modernizing and enlarging its antique force of long-rangemissiles, but only modestly, presumably to a point sufficient to ensurethat the United States will be respectful of Chinese interests in the westernPacific. Otherwise, China has joined the capitalistic world in the racefor economic development and profit.
Nomatter. The Space Commission did not require an existing threat to promotethe further militarization of space. It assumed that threats, large andsmall, would -- or could -- simply appear, like Topsy:
"Theability to restrict or deny freedom of access to and operations in spaceis no longer limited to global military powers," the commission's reportsaid. "Knowledge of space systems and the means to counter them is increasinglyavailable on the international market. Nations hostile to the U.S. possessor can acquire the means to disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems by attackingthe satellites in space, their communications nodes on the ground and inspace, or ground nodes that command the satellites."
But.. . should one nation, even a relatively benign nation, control space?That is not purely a domestic concern. By definition, control of spacewould affect the entire planet. And yet, if present trends continue, ago or no-go decision regarding space control will be made solely by theUnited States, not by an international body.
Theidea that the United States has the right to assume unilateral controlof space is widely accepted at Space Command in Colorado Springs, at theSchool of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama,in the inner rings of the Pentagon, in the minds of space-minded officersfrom the Atlantic to the Pacific, and, perhaps, in the White House.
Morethan a decade after the end of the Cold War, the world remains unpredictablydangerous. Americans need no reminders of that. The United States musthave well-trained and well-equipped military forces to help ensure itssecurity. Indeed, it should have the best trained and best equipped militaryanywhere, and it probably should be the world's dominant military power.The United States, after all, is a basically decent nation that seldomgoes out of its way to pick a fight.
Buthow dominant? At what point does overwhelming military superiority inspireso much fear and loathing among other nations as to provoke countervailingreactions? Realists talk endlessly about the "security dilemma," a zero-sumsituation in which a state that becomes extraordinarily powerful is seenby other states as diminishing their own security. Realists have a point.An attempt to take unilateral control of space could become a case of over-reachthat might, in the end, jeopardize American security.
Thedesire to enjoy freedom of action in world affairs is not a uniquely Americanaspiration. It is a universal goal for governments, although it is seldomachieved. The governments of all nations, whether they are democratic,authoritarian, totalitarian, monarchial, or theocratic seek to maximizetheir own freedom of action vis-a-vis other states. Like naked adolescentboys sizing up one another in the locker room, regional and global powersare forever eyeing their competition.
"Statespay close attention to how power is distributed among them," says Universityof Chicago political scientist John Mearsheimer, "and they make a specialeffort to maximize their share of world power. . . . Because one state'sgain in power is another state's loss, great powers tend to have a zero-summentality when dealing with each other."
Towhat extent does military preparedness by Nation A begin to make NationB uneasy that it is losing relative power, thus potentially compromsingits own freedom of action and possibly its own security? If Nation A isthe United States and Nation B is Britain or Israel, the question may bepointless, given their long-standing special relationships. But for nearlyevery other country, the question is compelling.
Whatdoes the United States mean by "full spectrum dominance"? For citizensof other countries, large and small, the phrase may sound at least a trifleominous, particularly in view of the fact that the Defense Department seemsto regard any spot on the globe as a potential "battlespace."
Inassessing the threat posed by existing or potential rivals, national leadersare far more interested in capabilities, demonstrated or presumed, thanin intentions. Capabilities are thought to be roughly measurable. In contrast,divining the intentions of another nation's leadership is a speculativeart that, in any event, is somewhat futile. Intentions can change as quicklyas governments. In contrast, capabilities have some degree of permanence.
Thoseof us who believe in the value of international cooperation and amity regularlycondemn excessive "realism." It poisons the international atmosphere; oneneed not look beyond the Cold War for a textbook example of that. If onlythe leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union had not been so short-sighted;if only they had had understood the commonality of humankind; if only theyhad appreciated that Planet Earth was the only home we will ever have;if only nations were run by angels and saints, there would have been nonuclear arms race, no threat of Armageddon.
Butin the world in which we live, there are no angels and saints, or at leastthey do not wind up as presidents or prime ministers or dictators. Whenit comes to national security, the leaders of nations are a suspiciouslot. They drink to one another's health in bilateral, regional, and internationalmeetings, but they keep their backs to the wall and a wary eye on everyone.Smiles and pleasantries are standard fare on the global champagne circuit,but actual trust is in short supply. The history of the world is writtenin blood and tears and the leaders of nations seldom forget that.
Assessingthe military capabilities of other states is a fundamental fact of worldpolitics. It is necessary and prudent. The kick in the pants, though, isthat measuring the military power of another nation is always a subjectiveprocess in which facts and factoids mingle freely and are filtered throughmulti-hued lenses.
Threatestimates, whether offered by governmental agencies or by private thinktanks, should not be treated as holy writ -- with one exception. The UnitedStates itself has come to be seen in many parts of the world as a potentialthreat.
Thatfact seems uncommonly mysterious to most Americans. Why do they hate us?Are we not the good guys? The answer is not hard to fathom. The militarycapabilities of the United States have been clearly demonstrated in theGulf War, in the skies over Kosovo and Serbia, in Afghanistan, and theyare staggering.
Insofaras threat estimates are attempts to assess capabilities rather than intentions,it is not odd that many nations have come to regard the United States withconsiderable wariness. The United States is widely perceived to be a statewith the technological wherewithal to do anything it wants to do and thearrogance to actually do it.
The chosenstate
Thedrive toward full spectrum dominance -- as well as the wish to controlspace -- is driven, in part, by U.S. analysts who believe that the UnitedStates has become the principal target of evil forces throughout the world,which may be true. Killing Americans is not an altogether unpopular idea,after all, in some precincts. It follows from that, goes the conventionalwisdom, that the United States must be prepared for any possible militarycontingency.
Preparednessis a good thing, but the logical outcome of too literally following throughon the idea that the United States must go all out to be ready for anypossible contingency is either bankruptcy or a police state -- or both.Most people, even in Congress and surely in the military, know that. Theyunderstand that choices have to be made. Unfortunately, most decision-makerswant the other guy to bite the bullet.
Nevertheless,one of the so-called "hard choices" is something of a no-brainer. Spaceis a horrendously expensive medium to work in. The United States militaryshould continue to exploit it with satellites that help U.S. ground, naval,and air forces fight efficiently and cleanly. That's the classic "force-enhancement"mission and it is reasonably cost effective.
Butthe hundreds of billions of dollars that would be spent in even the attemptto place weapons in space would surely be a waste. The money could be betterspent elsewhere. Pick a project; almost anything makes more sense than,say, space-based lasers. Meanwhile, the mission of space control couldbe accomplished through an international compact. That would be cheaper-- and effective, if the international compact had real teeth.
Butat the moment, we are talking ideology here, not dollars and cents. Thecompulsion to take control of space seems to be driven by a worldview thatsays, in effect, that the United States is the end state in human development.The United States should take control of space because in this troubledworld, only it can be trusted to do it right.
Whydo they hate us? Many hundreds of millions of people despise the UnitedStates because they live in an intellectual dark age and are culturallyincapable of understanding the values that make the United States a greatnation.
Buthow many millions of people distrust or even hate the United States becausethey know America well? How many resent its smugness, its self-righteousness,its willingness to intervene in the affairs of other states, its beliefthat it has a divine right to military supremacy because it can do no wrong?
TheUnited States has thought of itself as a kind of Chosen State from DayOne -- and even before. In the spring of 1630, more than a century beforethere was a United States, 11 small vessels sailed across the Atlanticto the New World with some 700 men, women, and children aboard, most ofthem Puritans.
Onthe Arbella, John Winthrop, who would soon govern the new religion-basedcolony of Massachusetts, composed a vision for the future that he sharedwith his brothers and sisters. The new colony, he said, would be a modelfor the Christian world: "Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon aHill, the Eies of all people are uppon us."
Winthrop'sspeech, which Ronald Reagan often cited during his presidency to the dismayof liberals everywhere, is one of the most evocative moments in Americanhistory. This new land, according to Winthrop and to every American presidentfrom George Washington to George W. Bush, was said to be an exceptionalnation populated by a people destined, perhaps by divine plan, to do greatthings. It would forever be a model for the world.
Aland that grand can follow its own rules, can't it?
"The strongdo what they can . . . ."
InMarch 1775, with revolutionary fever rising in the Colonies, Patrick Henryis traditionally supposed to have said to his fellow Virginians: "Is lifeso dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains andslavery? Forbid it, Almighty God. I know not what course others may take,but as for me: Give me liberty or give me death!"
Thephrasing may not be exact; Henry's speech was later committed to paperby another man. But however Henry said it, he got the gist right. A passionfor liberty lay at the heart of the American Revolution. Liberty, mostAmericans believed, was something worth fighting for and even dying for.It was, and I hope it still is, the core American value.
Butthe craving for liberty does not bear a Made in USA stamp. It may wellbe innate, a wired-in aspect of human nature. Consider the unhappy fateof the tiny island of Melos, which lies about halfway between Athens andCrete in the Aegean Sea. Today Melos has about 5,500 inhabitants, seventowns, and more than 70 beaches. Because of its multicolored volcanic rock,the infinite shades of blue and green of sky and sea, and its homes andshops trimmed in brilliant hues, tourism officials call it the "Islandof Colors." Twenty-four hundred years ago, the color was red.
Thestory of ancient Melos is known to us through the "Melian Dialogue," achapter in the History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides. In 416 B.C.E.,the 16th year of the war between Athens and its allies and Sparta and itsallies, Athens had experienced reverses and hardships, but it was stillthe most formidable military power in the Hellenic world. It controlleddozens of city-states, sometimes by the force of its ideas but often bythe force of arms. Athens was the self-described "master of the seas,"no small matter in a part of the world composed of peninsulas, archipelagos,and islands, a world in which land travel was difficult and sea blockadescould be devastating.
Accordingto Thucydides, Athens sent 38 warships, some 3,000 heavy infantry, 300foot archers, and 20 mounted archers to Melos. Although originally a colonyof Sparta, Melos had remained neutral in the war. Now Athens sought toforce Melos to become its ally and pay tribute. The Athenians, however,sought to get the job done with a minimum of muss and fuss. Before commencinghostilities, the Athenian generals sent envoys to parlay with the leadersof Melos. If the Melians surrendered without battle, said the envoys, Melianlives and property would be spared.
TheMelians demurred; they had a moral right to remain neutral, they said.The Athenian envoys said they would not trouble the Melians with fine wordsregarding right and wrong, mere "specious pretenses" in this context. "Youknow as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in questionbetween equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weaksuffer what they must."
TheMelians were not persuaded. They spoke of the shame of surrendering withouta fight and they said they were hopeful that Sparta might come to theiraid. The Athenians scorned the Spartans. Sparta had neither the navy northe boldness nor the inclination to help Melos, the envoys said. As forthe matter of shame, the Athenians, who understood the importance of honor,were sympathetic. But at this place and at this time, honor was not anissue that merited discussion. It would be no disgrace to submit to Athens,the envoys said, the "greatest city in Hellas."
Onceagain, the Melians said no. They had been free for 700 years and they wouldnot give up their liberty without battle. They would, however, offer friendshipwith Athens, but only if they could remain neutral, "foes to neither party."Unacceptable, said the Athenians; Athens would seem weak. If it permittedMelian neutrality, other states might be emboldened to rebel against theempire. Melos must submit; it could not cut a deal.
Althoughfaced with near-certain defeat, Melos chose to fight. Melos was eventuallyoverwhelmed and surrendered. The men were slain, the women and childrensold into slavery, and the island recolonized by Athenians. Other thanthe "Melian Dialogue," Melos is best known today as the place where theAphrodite of Melos, aka, the Venus de Milo, was found.
Libertywrit large
Insizing up Melos, the Athenian generals had not counted on the affectionits citizens had for political freedom. The Athenians assumed that Meloswould choose a prudential course when faced with an Athenian ultimatum.If it accepted Athenian suzerainty and paid tribute, Melos would retaina great deal of autonomy. In today's argot, it might have been called "theMelian entity." Instead, Melos chose to fight.
Thosewho speak of U.S. control of space and weapons in space may be as short-sightedas the Athenians. I need to be plain here. I do not suggest thatanyone in the United States government or in the U.S. military would threatenthe destruction of a city or a country from space.
Butsurely anyone, even a space-control partisan, must admit that phrases suchas "control of space" and "weapons in space" and "full spectrum dominance"have an inherently sinister sound. American intentions regarding militaryspace may be benign but its capabilities, judged by Space Command's LongRange Plan and the report of the Space Commission, could become terrifyinglyreal.
America'sfounding fathers, drawing upon the tradition of natural law and their ownreligious beliefs, believed in the innate dignity of the individual. Liberty,as noted a moment ago, is the core American value. The Constitution enshrinesit; the supreme law of the land was written "to secure the Blessings ofLiberty to ourselves and to our Posterity."
Theexact meaning and extent of liberty in the American context are endlesslycontentious matters, which is why the good Lord gave us the American CivilLiberties Union, God bless its collective heart. But in a rough sense,personal liberty seems to mean that individuals are free to do pretty muchas they please as long as doing so does not dramatically curtail the rightsof others to do as they please.
Inmuch of today's world, various forms of statisms, sectarian or secular,still reign and and individual freedom is suppressed. Nevertheless, thenotion of liberty for states has come to be everywhere admired, especiallysince the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 established the principle of nationalsovereignty in Europe. Freedom of choice for nation-states has long beenthe worldwide norm; it is an essential element in any definition of nationalsovereignty.
Realistsnote that nation-states exist in an anarchic world. They do not mean bythat that the globe is in a constant state of chaos, although it oftenseems that way. They simply mean that nations, at least in theory, aresubject to no higher coercive authority. There is no world government.Far from being a global-government-in-waiting, the United Nations is theprincipal guarantor of national sovereignty; nonintervention in the internalaffairs of nation-states is an iconic belief at the U.N.'s East River headquarters.
Althoughnonintervention is sacred U.N. scripture, weak nation-states have alwaysbeen at the mercy of powerful states. Athens could have its way with Melosbecause it was strong and Melos was not. The Hellenic city-states of the5th Century B.C.E. inhabited a lawless world, but the 21st-century worldis not nearly so disorderly. International customs, rules, covenants, treaties,and thousands of regional and global organizations, governmental and nongovernmental,help regulate and constrain the behavior of nations.
Andyet, as realists endlessly remind us, today's world is not altogether differentfrom the Hellenic world of ancient Athens and Sparta. Despite the plethoraof international and regional agreements and organizations, individualnation-states are, in the end, still responsible for making whatever arrangementsthey can to protect their national security.
Somestates are content to remain fundamentally insecure in the hope that noone will deign to bother them. That is not always a bad strategy; it workswell for nation-states that lack the kind of resources that more powerfulstates might covet. Bangladesh is probably safe.
Afew states seek security through armed neutrality. That is fine for Switzerland,a jaggedly rugged and well-armed nation that would be tragically difficultto invade in any event, but it did not work well for Belgium in World WarI.
Moststates, however, seek security through alliances, in which an attack againstone is an attack against all, or they find shade in the shadow of a powerfulstate. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have long enjoyed America's nuclearumbrella.
But,as always, the most powerful states are inclined to go it alone. For halfa century the United States and the Soviet Union did just that. The WarsawPact and NATO were not total fictions, but neither were they independentorganizations. Each alliance had its own 800-pound gorilla.
TheEast-West nuclear standoff during the Cold War was more dangerous thanmost people realize, and it was profoundly immoral in that the United Statesand the Soviet Union were prepared to destroy much of the world in thename of deterrence. Nevertheless, the Cold War was a textbook example ofa central point made by realists:
Throughouthistory, major military powers tend to "balance" one another, whether asindividual states or as parties to an alliance. Before the Cuban missilecrisis in October 1962, the Soviet Union and the United States attemptedto one-up the other in nuclear weaponry. After the missile crisis, theUnited States and the Soviet Union became increasingly committed to balancingtheir nuclear forces.
TheCold War is long over and the Soviet Union is the stuff of history books.Not since the Pax Romana has a nation possessed such unbalanced power asthe United States. The United States intends to keep a couple of thousandnuclear weapons deployed for quick use and thousands more in reserve. Ithas an ever-growing array of "conventional" weapons capable of attackingtargets with unprecedented stealth and precision. It has the best-trainedand best-equipped military personnel in the history of world and the "liftcapacity" to get sizable battle-ready contingents to any point on the globewithin days or weeks. Its high-tech lead over other nations in all thingsmilitary widens every year.
Andnow it is a nation that speaks, in some detail, of taking the high groundof space, controlling it, and possibly placing weapons in it.
Thatraises new and profound issues of national sovereignty. If one state becomesso overwhelmingly powerful on a global scale, in what sense do other statesretain their full measure of sovereignty? After all, isn't sovereigntyliberty writ large?
LastApril, Timothy Garton Ash, an Oxford scholar, a long-time friend of America,and a senior fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution at StanfordUniversity, said this about U.S. military power:
Itwould be dangerous even for an archangel to wield so much power. The writersof the American Constitution wisely determined that no single locus ofpower, however benign, should predominate; for even the best could be ledinto temptation. Every power should therefore be checked by at least oneother. That also applies to world politics.
A mind experiment
Weought to take the rhetoric of American spacepower partisans with a veryheavy dose of salt. Many of the schemes they speak of, particularly whenthey get to "force application" -- the capability to attack terrestrialtargets from space -- are so fantastic as to be doomed to fall of theirown weight.
Laserand particle-beam weapons in space that would be capable of destroyingmissiles in flight or damaging earthly targets seem to be technically undoablein the foreseeable future. The physics are almost impossibly daunting.Even the attempt to develop and deploy such weapons could be budget-bustingcostly.
Otherspace-based weapons that might be used against earthly targets -- kinetic-energydevices, for instance -- are more technically feasible, but they stillwould be extraordinarily costly. In the end, no matter how well they worked,it is difficult to imagine that space-based weapons would be so much moreefficient in earthly battles than terrestrial systems as justify the additionalcost.
Everymilitary system in space is rambunctiously expensively, a fact of lifespace warriors acknowledge. If a given military task can be done by a terrestrialsystem, goes the rule of thumb, go with it. Basing observation, warning,communication, meteorological, and navigation hardware in space has obviousadvantages; otherwise, space is difficult territory and ought to avoided.
Butthat is not the agenda for today's space warriors. In crafting vision statements,cost considerations are shoved aside and the rhetorical momentum for spacecontrol builds. We are the good guys, goes the Space Command/Space Commissionargument. Why would anyone worry?
Amind experiment may offer a clue.
Imaginefor a moment that another state had produced documents outlining why andhow it would unilaterally achieve control of space. Suppose that Chinaor Russia had declared that its intention was to achieve full spectrumdominance in the military sphere by, say, the year 2020.
Assumethat the chief of Russia's or China's uniformed military services had openlysaid that "our military is built to dominate all phases and mediums ofcombat. We must acknowledge that our way of war requires superiority inall mediums of conflict, including space. Thus, we must plan for and executeto win space superiority." (Richard B. Myers, now chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, said that when he was commander in chief of Space Command.)
Orpretend that either Iraq, Iran, Syria, or North Korea had told the worldthat it would build the capability to "dominate the air and space aroundthe world," an assertion commonly made by high ranking U.S. military officersand think-tank warriors.
Whatif Britain, France, Germany, or Japan had announced that it would achievemilitary dominance by developing space forces able to "provide virtualpresence through their ability to supply global mobility, control the highground, support versatile combat capability, ensure information dominance,and sustain deterrence"?
Whatif Switzerland or Sweden, Austria or Australia, or India or Indonesia hadauthored "Vision for 2020," with a full-color illustration of a space-basedlaser blasting a target?
Chooseyour country, friend or foe, assertive or passive, kingdom, democracy,or dictatorship. Imagine further that the nominated country actually hadthe scientific, technical, and financial resources to pull it off.
Thatlast requirement is a stretch, to be sure. The United States is the onlycountry that can even aspire to space control. But we are suspending disbeliefhere. Make a choice. Would you be surprised if Russia or a China or anyother country announced that it planned to control space in 20 years? Worried?Alarmed? Angry?
Rhetoricalquestions all. What right would any country have to unilaterally developthe capability to control space and to "deny" access to others if it sochose? If Britain, France, or Japan had such plans, Americans would demandthat Washington lean on the offending nation as hard as needed to forcea recantation.
Ifspace-control rhetoric had come from India or Indonesia, the United Stateswould call for condemnation in international forums and the impositionof draconian economic sanctions.
Butif such measures failed, the world would have a new space race. Militarydominance of near-Earth space rather than putting men and women on themoon would be the goal.
Thenew space race would be hugely expensive; it would suck intellectual resourcesand scarce capital into black holes of mutual suspicion. It would compromisethe ability of nations to meet everyday human needs. Worse, it would makefruitful cooperation on a host of pressing global problems less likely.
Nonetheless,let the race begin. The United States could not and would not let CountryX or Nation Y take control of space. Reasonable people in Boston or Chicagoor Seattle do not fret over Russian or Chinese satellites sliding overhead,unseen and unheard. That has been going on for decades. But ground-basedlasers capable of blinding U.S. satellites? That would be intolerable.Direct-ascent or space-based weapons capable of knocking out U.S. satellites?Unacceptable.
Andwhat if Country X or Nation Y actually developed space-based weapons decadesdown the line? Kinetic-energy weapons capable of taking out the White House,the Capitol, the Statue of Liberty; spacebombers that could swoop downon the Pentagon without warning; orbiting lasers that could zap Air ForceOne as it wings across the Rockies -- the prospect would be so horrifyingas to require immediate action.
TheUnited States may have the best of intentions. It may have no notion ofever denying access to space to another country except in extremis. Itmay have no wish to vaporize the satellites of other nations or to demolishbuildings with kinetic-energy rods shot from space unless a war was inprogress. It may not plan to ever shoot down planes with laser beams unlessit was first attacked.
Butwhat nation could afford to rely on the everlasting good intentions ofanother nation, even the United States?
Andwhat nation could afford to assume that the United States would fail totake control of space because of overwhelming technological difficultiesand horrendous costs? Americans, after all, are in the habit of makingthe impossible look easy. Twenty-five years ago, scarcely anyone aroundthe globe dreamed that the United States would be unerringly able to blowup targets as small as a house from 35,000 feet. Now it is routine. But only for the United States.
Velvet glove,steel fist
U.S.Space Command and Donald Rumsfeld's Space Commission argue that controlof space involves nothing more sinister than building a navy to controlthe seas or an air service to command the air. The analogy is faulty. U.S.air and seapower, while overwhelming, cannot be deployed everywhere allof the time. In contrast, space weapons, if developed, would be an alwaysthing, a pervasive Sword of Damocles, war machines orbiting overhead sevendays a week, 24 hours a day, whether in times of peace or war.
Wehave stepped through the Looking Glass here and entered a Wonderland inwhich words and phrases mean whatever Space Command and the Space Commissionwant them to mean. U.S. spacepower plans should not concern anyone, theysay. U.S. intentions are -- and would remain -- "nonaggressive," a deterrentto bad actors and a threat to no one else.
Theassumption that other nations would be comfortable with that formulationis bizarre. How many nations could afford to be as generous in interpretingU.S. intentions? What nation would be willing to play a Mother-May-I? gamewith the United States in regard to its own national security? What othernation would be willing to be subject to changing U.S. whims and geopoliticalaims? A nation that controls space would be able, by definition, to denyaccess to space to any nation of its choice.
EverettC. Dolman, a professor at the Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studiesargues in a book published this year that the United States should "endeavorat once to seize military control of low-Earth orbit." Only America, heargues, can be depended upon to regulate space for the benefit of all."The military control of low-Earth orbit would be for all practical purposesa police blockade of all [the world's] spaceports, monitoring and controllingall traffic both in and out. . . . In time, U.S. control of low-Earth orbitcould be viewed [by the rest of the world] as a global asset and a publicgood."
Notlikely. Nations everywhere give greater weight to capabilities than tointentions. Certainly the United States does. The Truman administrationdevised the Marshall Plan, at least in part, because it feared that theSoviet Union had the military capability to take over a demoralized, war-ravagedEuropean continent.
AlthoughPresident Eisenhower tried endlessly to divine the intentions of Sovietleaders, he put U-2 spy planes into the air and ordered that observationsatellites be developed to gather hard evidence of Soviet missile capabilities.
TheUnited States almost went to war during the Cuban missile crisis not becauseit believed that the Soviet Union would actually attack the United Stateswith nuclear-tipped missiles based in Cuba, but because the Soviet Unionwas developing a capability that would limit U.S. freedom of action.
TheReagan arms build-up was inspired by the fear among U.S. hardliners thatthe balance of power was tilting the wrong way and that the Soviet Unionmight develop superior missile capabilities that could, in turn, temptit to launch a "disarming first strike," the legendary "bolt from the blue."
(Forthat matter, it was Ronald Reagan who resurrected the Russian proverb,"Trust, but verify" in his later pursuit of arms control. Soviet expressionsof good intentions were welcome, he said, but the United States must beindependently able to assess actual Soviet capabilities.)
Formany years, American hardliners have cited China as the next major threat,in part because China is developing a more sophisticated capability inlong-range ballistic missiles. Fear of future Chinese capabilities is animportant hidden driver in the U.S. missile defense program.
(Inturn, China is modernizing its nuclear forces in part because it has longbelieved that a U.S. missile defense system would be designed to negateChina's retaliatory force. From a Chinese point of view, the United Stateswas developing capabilities that would ultimately limit the freedom ofaction of the Middle Kingdom.)
Andin 2002, members of the administration George W. Bush testify before Congress,as have their Democractic predecessors, that the United States discountsexpressions of good intentions in compiling threat assessments. They lookat the capabilities of states that are -- or which may become -- U.S. adversaries.
Thatis why North Korea, a backward state incapable of feeding its own people,is said to be a major threat to the world's sole hyperpower. North Koreahas missiles. To be sure, they may be little more than scaled up versionsof the old Nazi V-2s and American Redstones, but they exist.
Meanwhile,high-level commanders-in-chief of Space Command testify that U.S. controlof space is justified because other states will eventually gain the capabilityto challenge the United States in space. Therefore, the United States musttake preemptive action.
Allstates value their own sovereignty; they do not like to be at the mercyof another state, much less a nation that has repeatedly demonstrated technologicalwizardry and amazing capabilities in warfighting.
Tothe Defense Department and to Donald Rumsfeld and his team, U.S. controlof space seems sensible and necessary. But to other states, U.S. controlof space is more likely to suggest a velvet-glove hegemony that could somedayturn to steel-fisted imperialism.
A matterof balance
Theword "imperial" carries heavy baggage and I need to disassociate myselffrom extremists who regularly trot out charges of imperialism in theircontinuing excoriate-America campaigns.
TheAmerican writer and expatriate, Gore Vidal, for instance, regards the UnitedStates as a "police state" and a "loony empire" run by "the Pentagon junta."The New York Times, he says, is a "cheery neofascist newspaper," a judgmentthat says more about Vidal's analytic powers than the journalistic ethicsof the Times.
NoamChomsky, a distinguished linguist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technologyand the most prolific of U.S. radicals, characterizes the United Statesas the world's chief "rogue state," a nation whose "contempt for the ruleof law is deeply rooted in U.S. practice and intellectual culture."
Whenencountering such repellent rhetorical excesses, it is easy to forget thatcritics of the United States make valid points here and there. Americanpolicies and practices over the decades have been incredibly generous andhumane at times -- but they also have been high-handed and brutal at othertimes. (And in regard to Native Americans in the 19th Century, genocidal.)It is a sorry thing if we Americans glory exclusively in U.S. virtues whileignoring past U.S. sins.
Inplain language, an attempt by the United States to achieve unilateral controlof space and to place weapons in space would not be America's finest hour.It would be an insult to everyone on the planet. International law andcustom treats space as a global commons, a sanctuary, the property of allhumankind. It is not a thing to be trifled with by any nation.
Spacecontrol, on its face, is not a bad idea -- keeping control of what happensin space is necessary if humankind is to work its way toward a more humanefuture. Control of space by international compact with vigorous enforcementprovisions is the way to go. Such a compact would be doable and verifiable.
Whereaswork on some kinds of weapons systems, especially biological weapons, canbe rather easily disguised, advanced work on antisatellite weapons -- oron any substantial military capability in space -- is not easily hidden.At some point, development must be done in the open; it must be tested.Even the United States says it would require "testing ranges in space"to perfect ASATs.
Giventhat visibility, it would not be hard to design reliable verification techniquesand technologies that would prevent either an arms race in space or a ground-basedASAT race. So far, however, the United States has not given any indicationthat it will go down that road, which could eventually lead to an internationaltreaty to prevent an arms race in outer space.
Justas surely as the matter is brought up each year at the Conference on Disarmamentin Geneva, the United States blocks substantive action. In September 2000,for instance, Robert T. Grey, then the U.S. ambassador to the conference,said: "The United States agrees that it is appropriate to keep this topicunder review. . . . On the other hand, we have repeatedly pointed out thatthere is no arms race in outer space -- nor any prospect of an arms racein outer space, for as far down the road as anyone can see." He was right,of course, regarding the first part of his assertion. At the time he spoke,there was no arms race in space because there was only one entry, the UnitedStates.
Ifthe United States should choose to pursue an active policy of space control,and if it should choose to begin placing weapons in space, it would beacting with imperial arrogance. Unilateral control of space by any nationis unacceptable .
Nonetheless,evaluating the wisdom behind a possible attempt by the United States toachieve control of space in the 21st Century is not slam-dunk simple. Space-controlenthusiasts are surely right when they say that America's vital interestsmust be vigorously defended. They are correct when they say that the UnitedStates, more than any other nation, relies on its space assets, militaryand commercial, to help it fight and to keep its economy vibrant.
Butspace warriors are mistaken when they say that the United States must achievecontrol of space to ensure its security. In a world based on the principlethat nations are sovereign entities, unilateral control of space and weaponsin space would raise profoundly troubling questions regarding nationalsovereignty. Most likely, it would be regarded by many states as an intolerableviolation of global norms.
Manynations already hate or fear the United States, in part because of itsstaggering lead in high-tech warfare. One suspects, though, that most stateshave already come to terms with the fact that the United States will continueto be the most powerful state the world has ever known, militarily, economically,and culturally.
Butis there a tipping point? A bridge too far? A line beyond which even anation as benign as the United States cannot go without provoking somesort of reaction? If the United States military moves decisively into spacein this century, would that be like poking a sleeping junkyard dog in theeye with a stick?
U.S.spacepower partisans define space control as having the capability to grantaccess to space to the good guys and to deny access to the bad guys. Spacepoweradvocates frame that capability in the language of deterrence, a latentpower that would be exercised only when necessary. They simply ignore thelogical political consequences of that power. The United States would becomethe de facto judge, jury, and executor regarding space. A nation able to"deny" access to space to anyone would also have the capability to denyaccess to everyone.
Whywould any nation, even a friend, be content with that?
ConsiderCanada, whose officers work side-by-side and drink coffee with U.S. SpaceCommand officers in the closely parallel organization, the North AmericanAerospace Defense Command. (NORAD, U.S. Space Command, Air Force SpaceCommand, and Army Space Command share a campus in Colorado Springs.) Despitetheir decades-old NORAD ties to the United States, the Canadian governmentdescribes an attempt by any nation to implement "space control" as "destabilizing."
Ifthe United States chooses to pursue a program of space control -- and thatchoice has not yet been made -- all bets would be off. The consequenceswould be unpredictable. Many nations would presumably go along with iteither because they are old friends and allies or because they are so pooras to lack a choice.
Butat least a few states would almost surely develop "asymmetrical responses"to counterbalance increasing U.S. spacepower. There is some evidence thatAmerica's high-tech military lead is already inspiring such strategiesand programs here and there. Low-tech nuclear weapons -- and they can bevery low-tech indeed, if delivered by truck or van instead of a missile-- probably head the list. Biological weapons and possibly radiologicalweapons may not be far behind.
TheU.S. pursuit of space control would be a wild card in the global pokergame. The impact on other nations would be unpredictable, but surelysome states that had been previously sitting on the fence would be so alarmedthat they would take action.
U.S.control of space, says professor Dolman of the School of Advanced AirpowerStudies, would place "as guardian of space the most benign state that hasever attempted hegemony over the greater part of the world." It would bea bold and decisive step, and "at least from the hegemon's point of view,morally just."
Core value
Ifthe United States has moral authority in much of the world, and it surelydoes, it is because many hundreds of millions of people in other landsunderstand that the United States, despite its flaws, strives to be a fair,just, and democratic society. Assuming unilateral control of space wouldnot square with that.
In1863, in the midst of Civil War, Abraham Lincoln spoke of the meaning ofliberty and the symbolic importance of the United States to the world.The outcome of that conflict, he said, would determine whether the Americanpeople "shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of Earth."
Thebelief in American exceptionalism, so nicely highlighted by Lincoln, hasbeen both virtue and vice. It has helped make the United States a greatand dynamic nation, but it has also gotten the United States into a lotof trouble over the years. The Vietnam War, in which more than 58,000 Americansand more than a million Vietnamese died, testifies to how the United Statescan get things terribly wrong.
Andyet, the idea of America remains grand in conception if not always in execution.The United States is the most open, the freest, and the most diverse societyin the history of the world. The economic, political, cultural, and militarypower of the United States is enormous. Such power must not be misused.
Meanwhile,U.S. Space Command, Air Force Space Command, Army Space Command, and NavalSpace Command are developing doctrine, operational plans, and hardwareto operate more effectively in space. The Department of Defense is poisedto begin the process of taking control of space as soon as a president-- any president -- gives a thumbs up. And in 2001, a true believer inspacepower, a classic get-it-done guy, became secretary of defense.
SinceSeptember 11, 2001 Donald Rumsfeld has had to deal with international terrorism,a contingency that could not have been fully foreseen when he took office.That has absorbed his energies and will continue to do so. But sooner orlater, Rumsfeld -- or his successor -- is likely to get back to the mainevent: putting the U.S. military on track to take the ultimate high groundof space.
Whetherthe United States should seek to unilaterally control space is a political,philosophical, and moral issue of extraordinary importance, perhaps asimportant as the earlier question of what do about atomic weapons. Thefuture of military space ought to be debated widely and thoroughly in livingrooms and meeting rooms throughout the world, in the press and on TV, inthe halls of Congress and at the U.N.
Militaryspace issues are not clear-cut. They do not lend themselves to sloganeering.There are morally and politically compelling arguments on both sides ofspace-control issues. But it is clear that how the United States approachesand eventually decides these issues will tell the world just how deeplyrooted America's democratic values really are.
Anattempt by the United States to take unilateral control of space -- toassume the role of global space cop, as Wernher von Braun first suggested-- would mean that the United States had truly declared war on its corevalue: liberty for all.
Thenext few years are critical. The United States can maintain its moral authorityin the world by working with other nations to craft a treaty to preventan arms race in outer space. Or it can meanly lose its moral authorityif chooses to take unilateral control of space and to place weapons inspace -- weapons that would orbit above the heads of everyone, not justits enemies.