Breakthroughs (Spring1999), pp. 3-8
The Department of Defenseand a wide array of scholars, analysts, and visionaries outside the militaryassert that the U.S. military is on the threshold of a revolution in militaryaffairs (RMA). The revolution, sparked by rapid advances in informationtechnologies and information processing capabilities, has the potentialto transform the essential elements of the armed forces, favoring themwith a decisive advantage in future warfare. Proposals abound for exploitingthis revolution to ensure that the United States secures the benefits forits military and denies them to potential adversaries.[1]
Little has been said,however, about the long-term affordability of these proposals. How muchwill it cost to exploit a revolution? Where will the money come from? Ofcourse, it is impossible to answer either of these questions with any rigor.Specific proposals for exploiting the revolution vary widely, and someof the more futuristic suggestions do not lend themselves to the harshreality of cost estimation. And future defense budgets are difficult topredict with any accuracy. Yet an examination of just a few of the proposalson the table shows that capitalizing on the so-called revolution couldadd tens of billions of dollars to annual defense budgets a decade fromnow. Moreover, despite projections of huge and growing federal budget surpluses,finding the additional money will not be easy.
How Much Will It Cost?
Inside and outsidethe U.S. military, much of the discussion of a revolution in military affairscenters on the exploitation of information technologies to achieve informationsuperiority on and off the battlefield. The technologies that underliethe so-called revolution are those related to command, control, communications,intelligence (C3I) and information. The prevailing view is that these technologiesare cheap compared to the major weapon platforms that they support, andthat they will be even cheaper as the military capitalizes increasinglyon commercial off-the-shelf systems (COTS).
The truth is that thesetechnologies, taken as a group, are not cheap. The Defense Department currentlydevotes 20 percent of its budget — up from 15 percent in 1985 — to C3Iand information systems. Spending for these areas comes to about $54 billionin the fiscal year 2000 budget that President Clinton submitted to Congressin January 1999.[2] And the migration to COTS is not saving as much moneyas proponents once hoped. Using COTS lowers the price of individual componentsand software, but it raises problems of hardware and software integrationand replacement cycles for which the government still finds it difficultto plan.
$54 billion a yearis a lot of money by anybody's standards. It exceeds the entire defensebudget of every country in the world with the exception of the United Statesand Russia. It is just $10 billion lower than Russia's total budget fordefense.[3] At this price, if a revolution has not already occurred andbeen exploited to the fullest, then somebody ought to ask why not.
To be fair, not allof that money can be attributed to exploiting a revolution in militaryaffairs. A good deal of it supports Cold War legacy programs that RMA supporterswould call part of the problem rather than part of the solution. But itdoes pay for the information superiority that supporters say is the backboneof the revolution.
How much more wouldthe U.S. military need to spend to exploit the revolution that advocatesposit? It is not easy to determine an amount, in large part because thechanges that people have in mind are far from well defined.
Advocates argue thatmuch of the transformation they seek will come from changes in doctrine,operational concepts, organization, and training rather than through specifictechnologies or systems. They assert that a good deal of the technologyneeded is already at hand; exploiting it requires changes in culture andattitude more than additional investment in equipment.
It is difficult toestimate the costs of transforming culture and attitude. The Pentagon'sadvanced warfighting experiments and advanced concept technology demonstrationsare aimed at exploring new operational concepts and changes in doctrine.The Defense Department will spend less than $1.5 billion a year on themthrough 2005.[4] If these experiments and demonstrations represent themain path to transforming the culture, then transformation is relativelycheap and already covered in the Pentagon's budget plans.
But, despite the lipservice paid to cultural and doctrinal change, the transformation thatmany RMA advocates seek rests on a base of technology and systems. ThePentagon asserts that its current plans already support a transformationof the military by funding information technologies as well as a numberof "leap-ahead" enabling technologies. Nothing needs to be added to exploitthe RMA.[5] But to outside advocates, the technologies that the Pentagoncites as "leap-ahead" — the Comanche helicopter, the New Attack Submarine,the F-18 E/F and F-22 fighters — are just incremental improvements to ColdWar systems. Real exploitation calls for significant additional investment.
Proposals for new systemsrun the gamut from the familiar to the completely new. Some of the morefamiliar concepts include precision guided munitions, new mobile vehiclesto conduct more integrated C3I operations, and a battle management aircraftthat would combine features of the Joint STARS ground tracking plane andthe AWACS airborne warning and control system. Other ideas would add weaponsto platforms that today are used for communications or sensing rather thanas combat vehicles: unmanned aerial vehicles outfitted with conventionalweapons, projectile weapons based in space. Still other proposals offerconcepts that would be quite new to military arsenals, for example trans-atmosphericvehicles that carry precision guided munitions, combat vehicles that requireno fuel or ammunition, directed energy weapons launched from platformsnot yet invented, infrasonic weapons, and computer viruses used as weapons.[6]
Estimating the costsof items in the last category is a tricky business. The best cost estimatesfor a new system are based on a clear understanding of the system's design.They often incorporate comparisons with similar systems that have beenpurchased or at least attempted in the past. For the more futuristic concepts,the designs and their analogs for comparison are difficult to come by.
Cost estimates fortypes of systems with which the military already has some design experienceare more feasible. For example, one RMA supporter recommends that the militaryexplore technologies for precision weapons, smaller and more mobile computersand communications systems, information warfare, stealth, unmanned vehiclesand robots, and space-based systems, including weapons in space.[7] Technologieson this list lend themselves to cost estimation, using analogs like thecanceled Brilliant Pebbles program that would have put weapons into spaceunder President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.
The author of thatlist urges boosting research and development spending by $100 billion overthe coming decade to explore the technologies on the list. That $10 billiona year would be a major increase over the $34 billion that the Pentagoncurrently plans to spend on R&D in the coming decade. It would indeedpay for significant levels of technology exploration. But to assume thatnone of this exploration will lead to engineering and manufacturing developmentand then to procurement would be completely disingenuous. And as programsmature beyond the exploration phase, their costs rise. If just one programin each of those areas makes it into engineering and manufacturing developmentand then production, costs could rise an additional $15 billion a yearby 2010. Moreover, operating and support costs for the new systems willbe far from free.
In short, it is hardto pin a specific price tag on exploiting a revolution in military affairs.The Pentagon would have us believe that it is virtually free, that is,already included in its planned programs. One recommendation offered byan advocate outside the military calls for $10 billion a year above currentPentagon plans, but focuses on exploratory research and development. Overtime, programs that grow out of that exploration could add another $15billion a year in acquisition and more for operation and support. Thusa conservative estimate for a sustained program of technology explorationand force modernization based on just a few of the new technologies comesto $25 billion a year by the end of the next decade.
Where Will the MoneyCome From?
The Defense Department'smost recent budget comes to $263 billion in fiscal year 1999 and even higheramounts later in the decade. At first blush, it would seem that the Departmentcould pay for any transformation it wants out of that amount of money.
But the truth is thatdefense dollars do not go as far as they used to. On the acquisition side,weapons costs continue to grow, both from generation to generation andfrom initial estimates to actuals. The F-22 fighter will cost at leasttwice as much per airplane as the F-15 that it replaces and 20 percentmore than the Air Force currently admits.[8] On the support side, per-troopspending for operation and maintenance has grown in real terms by an averageof more than three percent a year over the past 25 years. O&M now eatsup more than 37 percent of the Defense Department's budget, compared with28 percent in the mid-1980s.[9]
The Clinton Administrationinstituted a major round of procurement reform and several initiativesaimed at bringing the Department's operating and maintenance costs undercontrol. These efforts have failed to achieve the promised savings.[10]New weapons cost increases are on the way, and O&M spending will shootto 39 percent of the budget for fiscal year 2000. The upshot is that retainingthe current force structure at current levels of readiness, and equippingit as the Defense Department currently plans, will cost as much as $40billion more each year in the coming decade than we are paying today.[11]
It is possible thatAmericans will be willing to pay that much. Projections of the U.S. federalbudget surplus are huge — $107 billion this year and more than $350 billionby 2009.[12] But that surplus depends on continued favorable conditionsin the economy and on adhering to the spending limits spelled out in the1997 balanced budget agreement — limits that would hold defense spendingfor several years at about last year's level in real terms.
Also, defense is onlyone of the claimants for the surplus. Social Security, Medicare, and taxcuts are all potential beneficiaries of the windfall. And with baby boomerretirements starting around 2010, pension and health care programs maydominate priorities for the marginal federal dollar in the coming decade.
If Americans are notwilling to boost defense spending significantly, then the gap between plansand money will have to be closed the other way by reducing defenseexpectations. The main choices for reducing defense plans can be groupedinto four categories: reprioritize and reduce existing programs in theareas of C3I and information technologies, constrain other modernizationplans, slice military force structure, or cut back on military infrastructure.
The Pentagon has triedfor several years to get the owners and acquisition agents of so-called"legacy" command and control systems to migrate to newer systems. The legacysystems, some in operation and some still being acquired, were conceivedduring the Cold War. Many of them were designed in what the military refersto as a "stove-pipe" fashion to handle a single function within a singlemilitary service or command. As a result there are numerous systems, andtheir functions often overlap. Moreover, some of them are quite cumbersometo use. Since they were designed years ago, the technology that they incorporateis generally not up to date.
Migrating to newer,joint systems would cut the costs of operating and building multiple systemswith overlapping functions and could free up some of the money that advocatesof transformation would like to see spent on new technologies. But pullingthe plug on legacy systems that support critical ongoing functions whenthe new systems are not ready has not been easy. Until new systems arein-hand and working, the military has little choice but to continue usingthe old ones.
Some advocates of revolutionhave suggested that the money to pay for change should be taken from thePentagon's ongoing modernization programs. They argue that most of theseprograms are left over from the Cold War and represent yesterday's technologyrather than tomorrow's.
The most lucrativesingle modernization cutback would come from canceling all three of themilitary's new fighter aircraft programs: the Air Force F-22, the NavyF-18E/F, and the multi-service Joint Strike Fighter. The combined procurementcosts of those three programs will be about $12 billion annually over thenext two decades. But the fighter airplanes in the force structure todayare rapidly reaching the end of their useful service lives. Unless theUnited States is ready to go without fighter aircraft altogether, cancelingthe three programs would require adding new funds to extend the servicelives of existing planes or to build new ones using existing productionlines. Either choice would eat into the savings achieved through cancellations.[13]As a result, the net annual savings achieved by canceling all three newairplanes might be between $4 billion and $6 billion.
Other expensive modernizationtargets include the Marine Corps' V-22 transport plane, the Navy's NewAttack Submarine, or the Army's Comanche reconnaissance and attack helicopter systems that the Pentagon classes as "leap-ahead" but that were largelyconceived during the Cold War. Canceling any of these systems would freeup money for new programs, but as with the fighter programs, the savingswould be significantly offset by efforts to extend the lives of the systemsthat they are intended to replace.
Fitting new procurementprograms into the defense budget when the Pentagon's purchasing accountsare already squeezed is not easy. The fiscal year 2000 budget for all ofthe military's weapons purchases comes to $53 billion. In contrast, theprocurement bill for the modernization scheme that the Defense Departmenthas already embarked on comes to more than $70 billion a year during thenext decade. The Defense Department wants to boost spending for procurementsignificantly in the coming years. But its hopes for future procurementincreases have been dashed time and time again in recent years as it hasconfronted its must-pay bills for operation and maintenance.
Some proponents ofrevolution argue that the right combination of air power, precision munitionsand information superiority will be so effective by themselves that theUnited States can significantly reduce its force structure — particularlyArmy force structure — thereby saving billions of dollars a year. Theymay be right. But significant sums will not be saved without massive forcestructure cuts and wholesale reorganization. For example, eliminating threeof the Army's ten active-duty divisions would save only $4 billion a yearin direct and indirect costs — far short of the $10 billion that one RMAproponent would like to add to R&D just to get things started.[14]Saving more would require significant cutbacks in the so-called institutionalArmy — the schools and other parts of the Army that would not deploy inwartime. And of course those savings and much more may be needed just tostay within likely defense budgets.
The final alternativefor reducing defense plans is to cut back on military infrastructure. Examplesthat have been examined by the Pentagon or others include closing an additional50 military bases; closing most of the military's hospitals and providingmilitary families with access to the health insurance program that coversgovernment civilians; eliminating the family housing at military basesin the United States and supplementing the troops' housing allowance tomake private-sector rents affordable; or dropping the taxpayer's subsidyto military grocery stores in the U.S.[15] Taken together, these changesmight save $5 billion to $6 billion a year. But each of them is extremelyunpopular with some sector: communities that might lose the bases or hospitals,advocates for military families and retirees, and to some extent the Congress.
One thing is certain:the Administration's plan for trimming at the edges of military infrastructureby outsourcing routine jobs like handling the military payroll or clippingthe grass on military bases has not yielded the promised savings. To savemoney on military infrastructure other than through base closures, theDefense Department will have to cut back significantly on services andfunctions that it is reluctant to part with.
Summary and Conclusion
It appears that transformingthe military to capitalize on any revolution in military affairs will beaffordable only if American attitudes toward defense spending in the post-ColdWar period undergo a sea change, or if the wholesale downsizing of themilitary and its modernization programs continues through the next decade.
The U.S. military alreadyspends a significant portion of its budget on the technologies and programsthat support information superiority. Some advocates of exploiting an RMAwould like to add more to explore new technologies. The extra annual acquisitioncosts incurred if just a few of those technologies lead to procurementprograms could exceed $25 billion. Operating costs will add to the budgetpressures. Given that the current defense program already faces a potentialshortfall in the neighborhood of $40 billion a year, any new RMA-relatedproject will face formidable competition for funds.
Money for new programscould come from adding to the defense budget, reprioritizing within theC3I category or reducing other defense programs. Despite large projectedsurpluses in the federal budget, freeing up new money for defense willbe difficult. Even if additional money is poured into defense, it willlikely be consumed just to maintain the status quo and shore up the wideninggap between the Defense Department's hopes and its likely budgets. Takingthe money from infrastructure or from Cold War C3I programs makes goodsense, but has been difficult for the Pentagon to carry out. That leavestradeoffs against force structure and other modernization programsÑasolution that appeals to advocates of change but is frightening to theServices, which are deeply concerned at the prospect of giving up forcesor modernization programs in exchange for unproven technologies.
NOTES:
[1] See for exampleWilliam S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington,D.C.: Department of Defense, 1999), Chapter 10; William S. Cohen, Reportof the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,May 1997); Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century(Washington, D.C.: National Defense Panel, December 1997), pp. iii, 28,37, 40-48; Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy: Four Alternatives Presentedas Presidential Speeches (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations,1998), Speech Two: An Innovative Defense; Andrew F. Krepinevich, "KeepingPace With the Military-Technological Revolution," Issues in Science andTechnology (Summer 1994); Michael G. Vickers, Warfare in 2020: A Primer(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996).
[2] Intelligence spendingestimates are drawn from the Federation of American Scientists World WideWeb site, http://www.fas.org. Fiscal year 2000 spending is assumed to mirrorthat for 1998, the last year of the Federation's data. C3 and informationsystems estimates for fiscal year 2000 result from a March 1999 telephoneinterview with the responsible analyst in the Office of Secretary of Defense.Historical estimates of spending for C3 and information systems are fromDonald C. Latham and John J. Lane, "Management Issues: Planning, Acquisition,and Oversight," in Managing Nuclear Operations (Ashton B. Carter, JohnD. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, editors, Washington, D.C.: The BrookingsInstitution, 1987), pp. 649-655. 1985 figures may slightly understate spendingin that year, since they do not include a specific category for "informationsystems."
[3] International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1998/99 (London: Oxford UniversityPress, October 1998), pp. 295-300.
[4] The Departmentof Defense's Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (Washington, D.C.:Congressional Budget Office, September 1998); Col. Wilt Ham, "Army DigitizationOffice," briefing, January 1999; May 1998 briefings on advanced warfightingexperiments from U.S. Air Force and United States Atlantic Command.
[5] William S. Cohen,Quadrennial Defense Review.
[6] Briefings by JamesBlackwell and Robert Bunker at the International Conference on the Futureof Military Doctrine, 16-18 March 1999, Caesarea, Israel.
[7] Future Visionsfor U.S. Defense Policy: Four Alternatives Presented as Presidential Speeches,Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 31-32. A similar but more comprehensivelist can be constructed from the boxes labeled "The Panel recommends" onpp. 23-42 of Transforming Defense. On p. 59 of that report, the NationalDefense Panel also recommends inserting an "annual budget wedge" of $5billion to $10 billion to fund initiatives in intelligence, space, urbanwarfare, joint experimentation, and information operations. (The panelwas mandated by Congress to address the future defense and security needsof the United States and was strongly committed to seizing the benefitsof the RMA.)
[8] A Look at Tomorrow'sTactical Air Forces (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1997),pp. 3, 5.
[9] Paying for MilitaryReadiness and Upkeep: Trends in Operation and Maintenance Spending (Washington,D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, September 1997), P. 5; Historical Tablesof the Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington,D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 50-78.
[10] Although advocatesthroughout the Cold War promised costs savings from procurement reform,the results have been invariably disappointing. See Thomas McNaugher, "WeaponsProcurement: the Futility of Reform," in Michael mandelbaum, America'sDefense (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989).
[11] "Plans for Defense:Will it all fit? Preliminary Results," Briefing by Congressional BudgetOffice to Senate Budget Committee Staff, November 1997.
[12] The Economic andBudget Outlook: Fiscal Years 2000-2009 (Washington, D.C.: CongressionalBudget Office, January 1999), Table 2-1.
[13] A Look at Tomorrow'sTactical Air Forces, p. 32.
[14] Structuring theActive and Reserve Army for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: CongressionalBudget Office, December 1997), p. 44.
[15] These and othercost-saving measures have been suggested in annual volumes of Reducingthe Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options, Congressional Budget Office.Also see, "Achieving an Innovative Support Structure for 21st Century MilitarySuperiority," Report of the Defense Science Board 1996 Summer Study (November1996).
ABSTRACT
Cindy Williams
PAYING FOR THE RMA
The U.S. Departmentof Defense and a wide array of scholars, analysts, and visionaries outsidethe military assert that the U.S. military is on the threshold of a revolutionin military affairs (RMA). The revolution, sparked by rapid advances ininformation technologies and information processing capabilities, is saidto have the potential to transform the essential elements of the armedforces, favoring them with a decisive advantage in future warfare. Proposalsabound for exploiting this revolution to secure its benefits and deny themto potential adversaries. Little has been said, however, about the long-termaffordability of such proposals.
The United States currentlyspends more than $60 billion of its nearly $400 billion annual militarybudget on command, control, communications, intelligence (C3I), and informationsystems--the technologies and programs that support information superiority.Although this is more than any other nation in the world spends in totoon its military, some U.S. advocates of exploiting the RMA would like toadd more to explore new technologies. The extra annual acquisition coststhat will be incurred if just a few of those technologies lead to procurementprograms could exceed $30 billion. Operating and maintaining any new systemswill also add to the costs.
Money for new programscould come from adding to the defense budget, reprioritizing within theC3I and information systems categories, or reducing other defense programs.As President Bush’s budget plan for the 2003 fiscal year shows, however,even when additional money is poured into defense, it is typically consumedjust to maintain the status quo, rather than to spur the kind of innovationsthat a revolution in military affairs would entail. Taking the money frominfrastructure or from Cold War C3I programs makes good sense, but hasbeen difficult in the past for the Pentagon to carry out. That leaves tradeoffsagainst current force structure and other modernization programs--a solutionthat appeals to advocates of change but is frightening to U.S. militaryservices, which are deeply concerned at the prospect of giving up forcesor procurement programs in exchange for unproven technologies.
Web Links:
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/db21/breakthroughs.html
REWARDING AND MANAGINGALL-VOLUNTEER MILITARIES IN THE INFORMATION AGE
MIT Security StudiesProgram
Modern militaries facedeep contradictons between the thriving, competitive, modern marketplacesin which their uniformed forces must compete for volunteer members andthe centuries-old traditions and systems that they generally rely uponto reward and manage them. Today's militaries must compete for networkspecialists and information engineers who are just as qualified as thosewho work for technology firms in the global economy. They must also hireand hold onto a pool of less skilled workers who will find satisfying careersin less challenging areas. Yet some countries, including the United States,try to accomplish both goals with a one-size-fits-all system of pay andbenefits that rewards people based on rank, years of service, and familystatus, rather than on skill or performance. Except in a few categoriesof expertise, the systems allow little flexibility in the rank at whichmembers enter service or the pay they receive.
A growing number ofcountries are now acquiring experience with non-conscript forces. Britainabolished the draft during the 1960s. The United States followed in the1970s. Western European nations are moving increasingly toward all-volunteerforces. During the past five years, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Francehave abolished conscription; Italy's parliament voted in October 2000 tomove to an all-professional force. German leaders continue to see conscriptionas a positive force in East-West integration, but Germany may still adoptan all-professional force in the future. Outside Europe, Australia, Japan,Canada, and India have all-volunteer forces.
Analysts and policymakers in some countries are exploring the benefits and feasibility ofadopting more flexible reward structures, embracing more flexible entrypolicies (perhaps allowing people with special skills or training to jointhe military at higher ranks), and making other changes in personnel policiesto improve the armed forces' ability to recruit, retain, and manage skilledand qualified cadres in the information age. This lecture will examinea variety of innovative approaches to such challenges.
Web links to usefulintroductions:
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/PrevDefChp8
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/t06132001_t0613qol.html
|
http://www.newsday.com/news/opinion/ny-vpwil032573896feb03020126.story
THE BUSH DEFENSE BUDGET
In With the Old in 2003
By Cindy Williams
Cindy Williams is a principal research scientist in the SecurityStudies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a formerassistant director of the Congressional Budget Office.
February 3, 2002
IN HIS STATE OF THE Union address on Tuesday, President George W. Bushsaid winning the war against terrorism and protecting the homeland arethe top priorities of the 2003 budget he will send to Congress tomorrow.The sheer size of the increase he proposes for national defense, $48 billionabove last year's level of $343 billion, clearly reflects the sense ofurgency and importance Americans attach to national security since theawful events of Sept. 11.
The special demands of the war on terrorism make it more important thanever that leaders make sound choices about the nation's defense. The president'splanned rise reflects a deep and unsettling problem, however: The administrationhas failed to set priorities and make important choices about the structureand equipment of future U.S. military forces. As a result, the Bush planwill waste substantial sums on forces and weapon systems that served thenation well during the Cold War but make little sense for the operationsour military faces today and in the future.
From a financial point of view, next year's increase is only the tipof the iceberg. If Congress accepts the administration's plan, then defensecosts will mount rapidly in future years as the bills to sustain the forcesand purchase new weapons accumulate. Moreover, failing to reshape our militaryfor the world we actually live in will dilute the military's ability tofocus on the grave concerns that face the nation, a consequence far moretroubling than the financial costs.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld planted the seeds for the largeincrease with the Quadrennial Defense Review he delivered to Congress lastOctober. The review, required by law in the first year of each presidentialterm, is supposed to describe the national- security environment, outlinethe administration's national defense strategy and lay out plans for militaryforces, equipment and budgets consistent with the strategy. While Rumsfeld'sreview rightly recognized that we live in a new world and that U.S. defensestrategy must change dramatically, it reflected none of the hard choicesabout forces and weapons that are needed to reshape the military to dealwith today's problems. Instead of the detailed blueprint for a new house,the review became an advisory notice that the old house faced imminentdanger from earthquakes, together with an artist's sketch of a modern butunattached kitchen.
For example, the Quadrennial Defense Review established homeland defense,rather than fighting wars overseas, as the top priority of U.S. militaryforces. Yet it offered no changes in forces to turn that new vision intoa reality. The National Guard and Reserves are playing a crucial role inhomeland security, with Guardsmen helping to protect U.S. airports, airspaceand borders. Nevertheless, the review did not recommend reducing the Guard'sCold War role in large-scale combat overseas - a role that conflicts withthe homeland defense mission that must now take precedence.
In another example, the report stressed the danger of "asymmetric threats"- low-tech, relatively inexpensive methods of attack that terrorist groupsor poor nations can use while avoiding direct confrontation in large-scaleconventional battles. The terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 wasa vivid reminder that surface ships are vulnerable to threats as simpleas a motor boat loaded with explosives. Yet the Rumsfeld review fell shortof recommending adjustments to the Navy's Cold War balance between surfaceships and more survivable submarines.
Similarly, the report placed new emphasis on readying forces to fightin foreign locations where access to bases, ports and airfields is difficultto come by. As the report presaged, Washington had difficulty in Octoberpersuading Afghanistan's neighbors to permit U.S. planes to fly combatmissions from their territory. Yet the Defense Department made no plansto reshape forces to rely less on short-range, land-based aircraft andmore on long-range bombers or aircraft carriers.
Finally, the Quadrennial Defense Review called for military transformation.Transforming the military into lighter, more agile, more mobile and morelethal forces that capitalize on modern technologies such as robotics andinformation systems was a lynchpin of the Bush presidential campaign. Yetthe Quadrennial Defense Review's approach watered the original conceptdown to look more like inching toward change. And the review made clearthat if any innovative systems were to be added, at least for the timebeing they would come on top of existing plans; it did not name a singleweapon system to be canceled or slowed.
Thus, the review kept all three fighter airplane programs - F-22, F-35joint Strike Fighter, and F-18 E/F - singled out by President Bush on thecampaign trail as an example of the Clinton administration's failure tomake tough choices. Even the Army's Crusader self-propelled artillery system,technically advanced and uniquely capable but ill-suited for likely futurefights, and the Marine Corps' V-22, plagued by technical problems and accidents,remained on the shopping list.
Reforming large institutions to cope with new environments requiresshedding the old as well as adding the new. For the Defense Department,keeping the old when it is no longer relevant means continuing to battleentrenched interests in the armed services, defense industry and Congress.Only by giving up forces and systems that no longer make sense can thenation make way for change in the military.
Some people argue that keeping everything is a good idea; in uncertaintimes, you never know what you may need. Aircraft carriers played a crucialrole in the war in Afghanistan; the Army will need heavy armored divisionsif we go to war against Iraq; Air Force fighter planes are now essentialto homeland security. Their examples do illuminate the importance of keepinga wide array of forces; nobody ever argued seriously that we should not.But those arguments have no bearing on the technical complexity required;an F-16 is better suited to flying combat air patrols looking for straycommercial aircraft than an F-22, and a lot less expensive. Nor do theyshed any light on the number of units we need.
In light of the tragic events of last September, Americans may be happyto pay this year's dollar price of keeping everything and deferring hardchoices. Unless taxes go back up, however, mounting defense bills in futureyears will cut deeply into the much reduced federal surplus the CongressionalBudget Office now projects for the coming decade, thus eroding the prospectsfor Social Security and Medicare just as the baby boom generation approachesretirement age. If those sacrifices are what it takes to achieve securityfor this country, then Americans will make them. But we should not be askedto make such sacrifices for slack defense management.
More troubling than the financial costs is the potential effect on themilitary itself if priorities are not set and forces are not reshaped todeal with the nation's most pressing challenges. Training for unlikelymissions diverts soldiers from preparing for the likely ones; buildingunneeded weapons ties up military procurement managers whose talents areurgently needed elsewhere. The effects on military capability and moralemay greatly exceed the financial costs. Only by setting priorities andmaking the sorts of tough choices President Bush promised on the campaigntrail can the nation come anywhere near achieving the military for theworld we now live in.
Copyright © 2002, Newsday,Inc.