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
Preventing Illicit Trade in Nuclear and Dual-Use Technology

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The problem: Illicit trade in nuclear technology

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Cargo seized from the BBC China. Source: Wikimedia

Iran's centrifuges include both indigenous and imported parts

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A: IR-1 outer casing: aluminum, likely indigenous

B: IR-1 rotor: aluminum, likely indigenous

C: IR-2m rotor: carbon fiber; material imported; fabrication indigenous

D: IR-1 bellows: maraging steel; maraging steel imported; bellows manufactured indigenously

Remainder: likely mix of indigenous and imported



Source: Iran Sanctions Panel of Experts, S/2014/934

But is this REALLY a problem?

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- ❑ Iraqi program dismantled.
- ❑ AQ Khan network shut down.
- ❑ Libya's program dismantled.
- ❑ Syrian program destroyed.
- ❑ JCPOA with Iran.
- ❑ Problem is in part in the eye of the beholder.

The emergence of the nonproliferation regime

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- ❑ NPT prohibits “non-weapon states” from acquiring nuclear weapons—part of a basic bargain to which they signed up.
- ❑ Since 1970, an entire regime of international controls has arisen **to restrict the transfer of difficult-to-produce technology and equipment that is essential for making nuclear weapons and is intended by the purchaser for that purpose.**
- ❑ Following 1974 Indian nuclear test, a cartel formed in 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), further tightening control of exports of nuclear and dual-use technologies. Stronger measures after 1991 Gulf War.
 - No prohibition on selling nuclear reactors or other nuclear technology to another state that will use it for peaceful purposes (unless that state is not a member of the NPT).

Stopping black-market nuclear technology networks: key elements

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- ❑ Intelligence and information
- ❑ Export controls (including border, trans-shipment controls)
- ❑ Law enforcement
- ❑ Interdiction
- ❑ Private sector self-policing
- ❑ Financial controls
- ❑ Targeted sanctions
- ❑ Anti-proliferation and anti-corruption cultures
- ❑ Reducing demand

Significant progress in recent years

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- ❑ UNSCR 1540
- ❑ UN, US, EU sanctions resolutions
- ❑ Proliferation Security Initiative
- ❑ Strengthening NSG guidelines;
- ❑ New Financial Action Task Force recommendations
- ❑ Widespread implementation of Additional Protocol
- ❑ Intensive diplomacy
- ❑ Number of states pursuing n-weapons smaller than in past decades

But...black-market nuclear technology trade continues

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- ❑ All recent nuclear weapons programs have relied heavily on illicit technology purchases
 - Iraq, Iran, N. Korea (at least for enrichment program), Libya, Syria...
 - Despite the increase in what can be made indigenously because of globalization
- ❑ Despite end of A.Q. Khan network, active shopping probably continues
 - State-directed procurement, N. Korea, Pakistan, others?
- ❑ Networks are sophisticated, flexible, adaptive, international
 - Tactics continue to change and evolve
 - Response must be equally intelligent, international cooperation required
 - Ongoing action-reaction cycle: new network tactics beget new controls beget new network efforts to find ways around them

Ways around controls on illicit nuclear and dual-use transfers

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Category	Examples
Wear sheep's clothing	False end-use certificates; front purchasers; shell companies...
Go below or around	Buy uncontrolled pieces rather than controlled systems; buy quality just below controls; buy not-yet-controlled tech...
Establish dedicated supply chain	Buy from proliferating states (e.g., N. Korea, Pakistan, Syria in past); Buy from proliferating companies...
Make it yourself	Make centrifuges, plutonium production facilities, weaponization facilities without much foreign supply.

- Procurement networks exploit several or all of these
- Most illicit transactions now are below-threshold or components of listed items – catch-all controls critical

Gaps in the system of controls

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- ❑ Intelligence gaps (e.g., poor business-government communication)
- ❑ Export control gaps (e.g., little ability to cope with transshipment)
- ❑ Sanctions and interdiction gaps (e.g., many states and firms have limited implementation ability in face of clever cover stories)
- ❑ Internal corporate compliance gaps (e.g., what to do about employees who leave the firm)
- ❑ International organization gaps (e.g., very limited authority)
- ❑ Gaps in financial controls (e.g., limited bank capacity to implement)

More generally: problematic communication, limited authority, not enough resources, weak commitment to solving the problem.

Recommendations

- ❑ Place the effort in five areas:
 - Achieving effective export controls worldwide
 - Improving the monitoring of suspicious trade in nuclear-related technology
 - Expanding intelligence capacity and cooperation,
 - Strengthening enforcement and stiffening penalties, and
 - Building joint efforts with key countries around the world.
- ❑ At the foundation of each of these strategies is building capacity, coordination, culture, and commitment

Conclusions

- ❑ Strengthened nonproliferation efforts will never entirely halt black-market nuclear trade.
- ❑ Effective steps to block illicit purchases of nuclear technology can sometimes succeed in slowing nuclear weapons programs, increasing their costs, and providing additional time and incentives for diplomacy to work...which may increase the chance that states will abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons.
- ❑ Success in preventing illicit transfers wherever possible is a key element of an effective global nonproliferation strategy.

For more information...

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More information is available at
[http://www.belfercenter.org/project/
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Thank you!

Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology

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Backup slides if needed...

Major gaps (1)

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❑ **Weak or absent channels for communication**

- Intelligence agencies to foreign governments, int'l organizations, private sector
- Members of NSG among themselves and to export control bureaucracies internally, and to private sector
- Private sector to and from government and between firms

❑ **No common standards**

- UNSCR 1540 requires “appropriate effective” measures – but no agreed definition, creating international patchwork
- IC and law enforcement using different standards of proof
- Financial institutions have widely varying approaches to when transactions should be blocked

Major gaps (2)

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❑ Limited authority

- Patchwork of jurisdictions and legal authorities, varying country to country, in some cases:
 - Bank regulators without authority to close banks or block transactions
 - Licensing officials without investigative authority
 - No mechanisms for contesting continued possession and use of illegally acquired nuclear goods
 - Weak sentencing authority for punishing offenders
- Very limited authority for international organizations
 - IAEA, 1540 committee, Interpol, WCO...

Major gaps (3)

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- ❑ **Lack of personnel, resources, and organizational capacity**
 - No int'l organization responsible for monitoring and disrupting illicit nuclear procurement networks
 - IAEA illicit trafficking group, export licensing authorities, customs services, banking regulators all often under-staffed
- ❑ **Commitment gap/lack of political will**
 - Underlying commitment to proliferation goal sometimes uncertain or low priority (e.g., in China)
 - Competing priorities in many states for resources and attention (esp. in poor countries)
 - Pro-trade factions weaken commitments to controls
 - Corruption sometimes defeats control efforts

Recommendations: Export controls

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- ❑ ***Expand efforts to achieve effective export controls worldwide***
 - Additional resources for existing export control assistance programs... including threat briefings... and linking to other border-security goals of recipients
- ❑ ***Establish international peer reviews for national export control systems***
 - Build around 1540 Committee, NSG, or PSI
- ❑ ***Examine establishment of “international export control task force,” modeled on the Financial Action Task Force***

Recommendations: Monitoring

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- ❑ ***NSG or PSI should establish an organization dedicated to tracking and disseminating information on suspicious trade that would...***
 - Analyze procurement network activities; report to governments and businesses; develop policy options
 - Formalize suspicious transaction reporting with clear gov't points of contact and protection from liability; establish as industry norm or make mandatory

- ❑ ***Establish an industry Nonproliferation Consultative Group to advise and support governments and international organizations***
 - Advise governments, IAEA, sanctions committees on current illicit shopping patterns, effective approaches to implementing controls, technology trends

Recommendations:

Intelligence + Law enforcement

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- ❑ ***Encourage close U.S. allies to establish dedicated intelligence teams focused on detecting and blocking illicit trade in nuclear technology***
 - Establish channels to cooperate and share information among these national teams where possible
 - Establish “red teams” as means to find gaps in counter-procurement efforts
- ❑ ***Strengthen enforcement of anti-proliferation laws and stiffen penalties***
 - Increase use of bounties and rewards
 - Update mutual legal assistance arrangements and extradition treaties – and provide such help when needed
 - Establish mechanisms for challenging continued possession and use of illegally obtained goods (as in other areas of illegal international trade)
 - at least to make clear continuing use is a continuing violation

Recommendations: US-China Cooperation

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- ❑ ***Approach China, India, Pakistan, and Russia with initiatives on countering illicit nuclear trade tailored to their specific circumstances***
 - China is the key transshipment or source country for most recent nuclear-related transfers to Iran and North Korea
 - The United States and China should form a standing Nonproliferation Working Group to address procurement issues and other challenges
 - Approach others with specific initiatives

Recommendations support JCPOA

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- ❑ **Stronger anti-procurement efforts support procurement channel, reduce risk of “sneak-out”**
 - Increased export control assistance, peer reviews, suspicious transaction reporting
 - New organization to track illicit procurement activities;
 - Industry Nonproliferation Consultative Group;
 - Dedicated intelligence teams in allied governments; stronger enforcement efforts and penalties;
 - U.S.-China Nonproliferation Consultative Group
- ❑ **Sustains anti-procurement agenda with like-minded states after sanctions eased**
 - Need to convince states to carry out dual-use end-use verification
 - Could low-capacity states allow others to fill this role?


Failures that allowed the A.Q. Khan network to continue for decades

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Category	Failure
Policy	Failure to act on uncertain information Other priorities
Intelligence	Failure to detect; failure to cooperate (until late)
Export Control	Lack of laws; limited implementation, enforcement
Private Sector Controls	Few companies then had strong controls in place
Law Enforcement	Network participants mainly free (and rich) today (though many spent some time in jail)
Financial Controls	Were not yet in place for nonproliferation
Sanctions	Multilateral sanctions were not yet in place for key countries
Nonproliferation Culture	Weak cultures encouraged supply, or low priority on stopping illicit supply

Nuclear technology supply chain

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Limits on the ability to stop illicit nuclear technology transfers

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- ❑ Limited knowledge
 - Proliferating states and those helping them keep their activities secret — good intelligence is key, but difficult to get
- ❑ Limited resources
 - For enforcement, for awareness, for outreach, for training...
- ❑ Limited willingness to disrupt legal trade
 - Many technologies dual-use
 - Measures for licensing, screening, inspecting, etc. all slow down legal trade
- ❑ Limited international cooperation
 - Greater sharing of intelligence, trade data, law enforcement info could help disrupt global networks
 - Example: data on license denials and suspicious inquiries

Nuclear technology: learning from success and failure

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- ❑ **Failure:** A.Q. Khan network operates for ~20 years in ~20 countries
 - Lesson 1: all countries need effective export controls, enforcement
 - Lesson 2: companies need effective internal compliance programs
 - Lesson 3: sophisticated global networks are hard to stop
- ❑ **Success:** International police and intelligence cooperation ultimately takes down the network
 - Lesson: critical to establish broad intelligence and police cooperation targeted on black-market nuclear technology networks
- ❑ **Failure:** Minimal or no jail time for network operatives
 - Some cases: laws so weak there were no major violations
 - Other cases: evidence can't be produced in court
 - Other cases: poor sharing of evidence between countries
 - Other cases: weak commitment

Key conclusions

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❑ **Intelligence**

- Strengthened since 2003
- Improved coordination and international sharing
- Enhanced use of cyber
- But evolving threat, difficult obstacles to wider cooperation, little business-government reporting

❑ **Export controls**

- Strengthened laws, implementation worldwide (with some exceptions)
- Networks forced to seek below-threshold items
- Catch-all provisions added (NSG and UNSCRs), playing increasing role
- But technology spreading, indigenization growing, evasive strategies still succeeding, developing states have few resources for implementation, China (and others) still pose challenges

Key conclusions (2)

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❑ Sanctions and interdictions

- Stringent sanctions, increased interdictions *are* hindering nuclear weapon programs
- Broad economic sanctions helping to dissuade states from pursuing this course
- Sanctions can buy time and create incentives for diplomacy, *but* always have gaps and can also spur indigenization

❑ Financial measures

- Asset freezes, denials of access to Western banking system, prohibiting the use of SWIFT, and Financial Action Task Force anti-money laundering measures all disrupting networks
- But networks developing work-arounds (though complexity still inhibits transactions), Implementation by financial institutions spotty in some cases, overbroad in others

Key conclusions (3)

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❑ **Law enforcement**

- Can disrupt, shut down networks
- Threat of punishment increases private sector compliance, deters some actors from participating
- But combination of few prosecutions and lenient penalties undermining deterrence; need for increased international sharing, help

❑ **Private sector**

- New barrier for networks through great increase in due diligence in manufacturing, courier, shipping, insurance, and financial sectors
- But small and medium-sized firms often lack resources to implement rigorous oversight, insider threats remain a serious problem, and technology may be provided by former employees outside the firm's control

Key conclusions (4)

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❑ IAEA and other international organizations

- UNSC playing major role with passage UNSCR 1540 and Iran/North Korea sanctions resolutions
- But sanctions committees have few resources, rely on member states to provide information
- IAEA has extensive experience in tracking illicit nuclear trade
- But IAEA has no authority to disrupt or punish, most states do not allow direct discussions with firms and provide only limited intelligence, information goes *only* to safeguards department

❑ Nonproliferation culture

- Shared belief in importance of nonproliferation measures increasing in government, research, and private sectors
- But still often weak awareness, and less in small and medium-sized firms and in some countries; competes with other institutional priorities

Corruption is a central enabling element

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- ❑ Corruption is critical to all these networks – people who, for money, knowingly:
 - Provide nuclear weapons-related material or technology
 - Facilitate theft (e.g., providing inside information on security)
 - Approve illegal exports
 - Allow materials across borders
 - Etc.
- ❑ Two campaigns needed:
 - A *nonproliferation culture* campaign – getting people in all key positions to understand that the spread of these materials and technologies is a danger to their countries and to the world
 - A *counter-corruption* campaign – training, transparency measures, penalties, incentives, etc...

Participants in corrupt environments may perceive little risk

Can we deter network participants? (1)

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- ❑ Increase perceived probability of detection:
 - All the measures just described
- ❑ Increased perceived scale of consequences:
 - Put in place “appropriate effective” criminal laws prohibiting participation in such networks, with stiff penalties
 - Renew commitment to enforcement in all countries
 - Strengthen police and judicial cooperation
 - Extra-territorial jurisdiction: ability to punish offenders wherever they may be
 - » Required by Physical Protection Convention, Nuclear Terrorism Convention

This is where 1540, 1373, and extraterritorial jurisdiction contribute to reducing the risk

Can we deter network participants?

(2)

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- ❑ Many participants may be deterred/dissuaded by increased perception that what they are doing is wrong
 - Nonproliferation culture: belief this threatens many
- ❑ Different risks may deter different participants
 - Desperate low-level smugglers may require high chance of being caught, high consequence if they are, to deter them
 - Well-to-do engineers may be deterred by more modest risks – though many millions of dollars are at stake in some deals
 - Legitimate companies often strongly motivated by risks to their reputation
 - Once terrorists are smuggling an assembled bomb, or ready-to-assemble pieces, the object(s) will represent a huge amount of effort and money – may be deterred by relatively modest chance of being intercepted and having it all go to waste