

# **The Future of Security and Defense of Europe**

## **EU vis-à-vis NPT, CTBT, and Ban Treaty**

**A.A.Soltanieh**

**Former Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations  
and other international organization, Geneva & Vienna**

**Nebrija University & CICA**

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### **Abstract**

European Union is a complex non-coherent group of countries, as far as the nuclear capabilities and nuclear policies/diplomacy of its member states, are concerned. The following factual information shed lights on the status quo:

- Two members, at least till full realization of Brexit, the UK and France, are nuclear weapon states party to the NPT and permanent members of UN Security Council. They are exempted from any safeguards inspection of the IAEA and EURATOM which are applied to other members of the EU;
- The nuclear weapon is part of national security strategy of UK and France, and modernization of nuclear weapons is main part of their nuclear doctrine.
- The genuine calls upon UK and France in the context of national policies of the EU Non-nuclear weapon State parties to the NPT, usually echoed in international arena have been always disregarded;
- The perseverance of France and UK on modernization of nuclear arsenal, billion -pound investment of Trident, assumed required future nuclear tests, are in full contravention with the CTBT. Therefore, the EU declared position supporting the CTBTO is in question;
- Among the EU members Belgium, The Netherland, Italy and Germany have the deployed nuclear weapons of the United States in their territories, in contravention with article I and II of the NPT;
- Not all members of the EU are party to NATO. The harsh public criticism of EU members of NATO by present US Government leave no doubt of more US aggressive security policies vis-à-vis EU;
- The Extended deterrence by NATO and United States contradicts the obligations of EU members and US under articles I and II of the NPT,
- The PESCO as well as recent EU attempts to establish Security and Defense Union, in the context of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), parallel to NATO, is a new

important development but it is not yet clear how effective the assumed independent function might be,

- All EU members except Austria and Ireland boycotted the negotiation on and voting against the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), so called Ban Treaty;
- Some members are very active in nuclear fuel cycle, including vast uses of nuclear power plants, such as France which is at one extreme side, and Austria, banning nuclear activities, even for peaceful purposes, which is at the other extreme side;

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**The following short review of international developments would clarify the role of the European Union on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and ultimate goal of “World Free from Nuclear Weapons”:**

## **EU vis-à-vis NPT**

### **Universality of NPT<sup>1</sup>**

Although, once in a while, there are statements by EU on the necessity of universality of the NPT, such the one by Ms. Federica Mogherini at the 10<sup>th</sup> Article XIV Conference in 2017, expressing: *The EU policy is to pursue the implementation and universalization of the existing disarmament and non-proliferation norms. To that end we pursue the universalization of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.*” {2}, but there is no tangible and action oriented and result based gesture by EU in this respect. One has to notice that the security threat by Israeli huge nuclear weapon activities, is the main reason of stale mate situation of Establishment of Middle East Free Zone. Reviewing EU statements, one could not find any strong positions in this respect. The historical essential role of couple European countries in providing Israel with sensitive nuclear technology and material, including reactor specially designed for production of nuclear weapon grade Plutonium, as well as high enriched uranium and heavy water is undeniable, thus creates more accountability for EU.

After the open announcement of Mr. Olmert then the prime minister of Israel, in an interview with German newspaper in 2004, regarding the passion of nuclear weapons, and the denial of its Ambassador to the IAEA the Board of Governors, the author, on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran, official requested a fact Find Mission, with voluntarily bearing the cost, to clarify who is telling the truth, the prime minister or the Ambassador of Israel. IAEA did fulfil its responsibility due to pressure by Israeli allies, US and EU. In fact, EU did not even comment on such an important issue regarding international peace and security.

### **Nuclear Weapon State Non-compliance with article VI**

The Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) were obliged under Art. VI of the NPT to “*undertake negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at*

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<sup>1</sup> Non-proliferation Treaty

*an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”*

A serious weakness of the NPT has been that it contains no deadlines for the cessation of the nuclear arms race nor for a treaty on general and complete disarmament. And it includes no means to enforce these NWS obligations, nor any legally binding penalties or sanctions for the non-fulfillment of their obligations associated with the letter and spirit of the NPT.

The author and Dr. Mauntner Markhof, the head of ACIS, thoroughly reviewed the NPT implementation during last four decades and proposed three options to save the NPT, at the recent NPT Pre.Com. in Geneva {5}:

1. NPT Review Conference to decide (1) on legally binding deadline to start the negotiations envisaged under Art. VI; (2) a legally binding timeline for significant, verifiable reduction of NWS aimed at their ultimate elimination; and (3) legally binding measures to ensure compliance with all NPT obligations and to deal with non-compliance.
2. To convene an amendment conference according to article VIII of the NPT to amend the article VI of NPT, putting deadline which it lacks.
3. An option of last resort, the “nuclear option” to save the non-proliferation regime, would be the threat of collective withdrawal of NNWS from the NPT under Article X of the Treaty unless the NWS make a legally binding commitment to fulfill all their NPT obligations in good faith, in particular Articles I, II and VI, by agreed deadlines.

EU has neither criticized the shortcoming of the NPT text specifically article VI, lacking deadline for elimination of nuclear weapons, nor it has condemned P5 non-compliance and nor it has demanded, strongly, full compliance with this article and rectification of unaccepted status quo. Perhaps mainly due to objection by France and UK.

It is expected that EU supports these gestures in order to save the NPT which is at its worst situation after failure of Review Conference 2015, total failure of Middle East Free Zone, disregards of unanimous decision of 2010 NPT Review Conference.

New US NPR which is serious setback to NPT and unilateral withdrawal of US from JCPOA, have already threatened the NPT future leading to possible collapse of Review Conference in 2020. In the course of the preparation for High Level Conference on Disarmament {6} as well as during the conference in 2018, some non-nuclear weapon states reflected their concerns of the consequences of such an action {8}.

## **EU vis-à-vis CTBT<sup>2</sup>**

While the NPT is a discriminatory treaty, the CTBT is not. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear explosions by everyone, everywhere: on the Earth's surface, in

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<sup>2</sup> Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

the atmosphere, underwater and underground. It makes it very difficult for countries to develop nuclear bombs for the first time, or for countries that already have them, to make more powerful bombs. It also prevents the huge damage caused by radioactivity from nuclear explosions to humans, animals and plants. Over 2000 nuclear tests were carried out between 1945 and 1996, when the CTBT opened for signature: by the United States (1000+), the Soviet Union (700+), France (200+), the United Kingdom and China (45 each).

There are evidences that Israel did nuclear test, jointly with South Africa near Prince Edward Island in South Pacific Ocean, on 22 September 1979.

One hardly finds any EU statement of even expression of concern or request for inquiry and fact-finding mission.

Three countries have broken the de facto moratorium and tested nuclear weapons since 1996: India and Pakistan in 1998, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016.

Many attempts were made during the Cold War to negotiate a comprehensive test ban, but it was only in the 1990s that the Treaty became a reality. In fact, during NPT Review Conference in 1990, in Geneva, tough challenges by Non-aligned Movement(NAM) vis-a-vis three Weapon State Parties to the NPT, US, USSR, and UK (France and China were not yet party to the NPT), on the issue of banning the nuclear test paved the way for creation of CTBTO. The author had the honor to participate at historical negotiation, almost 8 hours till 4 am, representing NAM Asian Members.

The CTBT was negotiated in Geneva between 1994 and 1996. One hundred and eighty-three countries have signed the Treaty, of which 164 have also ratified it, including three of the nuclear weapon States: France, the United Kingdom from EU and Russian Federation. But 44 specific nuclear technology holder countries must sign and ratify before the CTBT can enter into force. Of these, eight are still missing: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA. India, North Korea and Pakistan have yet to sign the CTBT{3,7}.

The author has proposed, at the CTBT Symposium on Science and Diplomacy, held in Vienna, on 17 April to 1<sup>st</sup> June 2018, the necessity of thorough review of the reasons that the remaining 8 have not yet ratified the CTBT.

All Eu members are party to CTBT including the two Nuclear Weapons States, UK and France. There is a concern whether these two will resume the nuclear test, as the US recent announcement, in NPR, of not ruling out.

### **EU vis-à-vis Ban Treaty<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), so called Ban Treaty

On 23 December 2016, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a resolution on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, thus paving the way for a conference in 2017 to “*negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination*”. The adoption of the resolution has been hailed as historic by supporters of an initiative that has gained ground in the last few years to rid the world of the most destructive

weapon known to humankind. Opponents of treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), argue that the deterrence provided by nuclear weapons is essential to maintain the existing global order, and the official nuclear-weapon states have mostly indicated that they will not participate in the conference {1}.

The majority of United Nations member states voted in favor of the resolution, but five nuclear-armed states and all but four NATO members voted against it.

The supporters of the TPNW, consider it as a landmark international agreement prohibiting a range of nuclear weapon-related activities, including acquiring, manufacturing, developing, testing, possessing and stockpiling nuclear weapons, threatening to use these weapons, or allowing any nuclear arms to be stationed on the territory of states party to the treaty. Proponents hail the treaty as historic, designed to stigmatize and delegitimize nuclear weapons possession and use. They maintain that it will establish a new norm akin to the ban on landmines, cluster munitions and chemical weapons. Frustrated and angry at the slow pace of disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, supporters believe that the treaty closes a “legal gap” for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and finally establishes a pathway for the elimination of nuclear weapons, complementing the efforts of existing disarmament frameworks such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

EU Member States, most of which are members of NATO, have taken different positions on the prospect of a nuclear weapons ban, with some supporting it, but most against {10}.

The European Parliament welcomed the convening of a conference in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, noting that this would reinforce the non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and obligations contained in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and help to create the conditions for global security and a world without nuclear weapons. In a resolution adopted on 27 October 2016, the European Parliament invited the EU Member States to support the convening of such a conference in 2017 and ‘*to participate constructively in its proceedings*’ {8}.

On 7 December 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the Humanitarian Pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, in the form of Resolution 70/48. Advocates of the total elimination of nuclear weapons take the view that a comprehensive ban is the only way to save the world from the potentially catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapon explosion, which ‘would not be constrained by national borders but have regional or even global effects, potentially threatening the survival of humanity’. Opposition to a ban on

nuclear weapons Opponents of a ban on nuclear weapons consider nuclear weapons to be an essential element of deterrence and, as such, a means to prevent conflict and war. Deterrence is a military doctrine according to which the risk that a country will retaliate with the nuclear weapons it possesses deters an enemy from attacking. Nuclear deterrence continues to be an important aspect of the security policies of all nuclear-weapon states and their allies. Members of NATO, a military alliance that includes three nuclear-weapon states—France, the United Kingdom, and the USA— confirmed in July 2016 that they consider credible deterrence and defense to be essential, and that nuclear defense capabilities will remain a core element of NATO’s overall strategy.

EU Member States have very different views on a ban on nuclear weapons. France and the United Kingdom, two nuclear-weapon States under the NPT, have full commitment to incremental nuclear disarmament, but consider nuclear weapons to be an essential part of their security strategies for the time being. Almost half a century has passed and no progress is made due to misleading notion of “incremental nuclear disarmament”.

Besides France and the UK, a further 20 EU Member States are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) and have signed up to NATO’s commitment to nuclear deterrence. This includes four states that host US tactical nuclear weapons (Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands), and 16states that are covered by NATO’s ‘extended nuclear deterrence pledges’, including all the eastern Member States.

At the other end of the spectrum, Austria, which is not a NATO member, is one of the key drivers of the Humanitarian Initiative, which seeks to eliminate nuclear weapons, and the country that tabled Resolution L.41 at the UN. The EU statement to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, based on Council conclusions adopted on 20 April 2015, and the statement on the EU priorities at the 71st UN General Assembly, based on Council conclusions adopted on 18 July 2016, reiterated the current ‘EU common position’, namely the EU’s general commitment to nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT.

21 EU Member States voted against Resolution L41, while five voted in support and two abstained.

It is worth mentioning that the European Parliament On 27 October 2016, just hours before the adoption of ResolutionL.41 by the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, the European Parliament adopted a resolution welcoming the completion of the work of the UN open-ended working group. The EP resolution invited the EU Member States to support the convening of such a conference in 2017 and to participate constructively in its proceedings. The resolution was adopted by 415 votes to 124, with 74 abstentions.

Considering the fact that the EU parliament represent the EU public, one could easily conclude that the European people concern and priority does not coincide with EU Governments as a whole.

On May 8 2018 Austria has become the ninth state to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TNPW). Austria is well known as one of the key drivers and champions for

the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In 2014 Austria hosted the Third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which culminated in a Humanitarian Pledge, ultimately signed by 127 states. Through UN General Assembly meetings and UN Working Groups, Austria has consistently and stridently carried the flag for a ban on nuclear weapons. Austria's early ratification of the TPNW demonstrates that it intends to continue to take a leadership role in the implementation of the treaty and promote its universalization.

Now the TPNW is a reality and after its EIF (Entry into force) , it will be a serious dilemma on nuclear Non-proliferation and disarmament for years. While representatives of proponents and opponents of TPNW, busy debating at UN, that is why are paid for, the nuclear weapon states freely continue modernization with billion dollars projects and testing augmenting security threat to 7 billion people of the world and total destruction of the globe. What is the role of EU?

The author declared at the CICA conference in 2017 in Madrid, that without questioning the good intention of the proponents of this treaty, in fact the very legitimate long-standing demand by Non- nuclear Weapons States for "Nuclear Weapon Convention" is put aside and the huge pressure on nuclear weapon states is somehow diffused, specifically by other Non- nuclear weapon states joining them to boycott the TPNW have shared the blame by internal community.

Considering the fact that the last 12 months have seen momentous developments in the area of EU security and defense. EEAS Deputy Secretary General for Security and Defense, Pedro Serrano, reviewing the EU implementation of the Global Strategy which set the security of EU on as a priority, said (on 20/ 10/ 2017) : "*While NATO remains the primary framework for most member states, a more credible European defense is essential for our internal and external security. This includes fighting terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change, and energy insecurity*". The question is whether such evolution shall have any impact on EU policy vis-à-vis NPT, CTBT, and Ban Treaty or not?

### **Deployment of US Nuclear Weapons in Europe**

The United States has deployed nuclear weapons in 4 non-nuclear weapon states: Germany, the Netherland, Belgium, and Italy, as well as in Turkey, as part of NATO's nuclear-sharing program. It is estimated that 200 of US B61 nuclear bombs are in such European countries.

Article I of the NPT stipulated:

*" Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices"*{2}.

Therefore, transfers and deployments of Nuclear Weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapon state parties in Europe by the United States is a crystal clear violation of NPT.

The US program on training non-nuclear State Parties in Europe, on the use of its tactical nuclear weapons is also violation of article I of the NPT.

In this context reference is made to the concern by Russian expressed by Mr. Lavrov on 28 February 2018: “Everybody should understand that the US military are preparing European states to use tactical nuclear weapons against Russia”

Article II which says:

*“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”{2}.*

Unless the 4 EU Non-nuclear Weapon State Parties to NPT, give up the sovereign right of the territory assigned and used for the deployed US Nuclear Weapons, and be considered as territory of US, they are also violating the NPT. One could anticipate that the nations of these countries shall not permit to give up their home land to the United States. This legal concern on violation of NPT is also applied to the 5<sup>th</sup> host, Turkey as well.

The lack of utility of such tactical nuclear weapons is another reason for the necessity of prompt removal of these four non- nuclear weapons state parties to NPT in Europe.

### **EU vis-à-vis New US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)**

A-Contrary to the public strong supporting position of EU on the CTBT, the EU has not so far had strong opposition and even expression of concern regarding the new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States {11}, which has declared the justification for further nuclear tests, which is definitely in violation of spirit and letter of the CTBT. Though the US has not ratified the CTBT yet but in accordance with international law, it has obligation under the CTBT not to act in contravention with, including nuclear test.

The quotation of the relevant part of the NPR shall speaks for itself:

*Although the United States will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it will continue to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Committee as well as the International Monitoring System and the International Data Center. The United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing {11}.*

One striking unprecedented point is the fact that US now has declared that: “*United States will not seek ratification*”, therefore, the US as a signatory state, has no intention to ratify the CTBT, where its ratification is a prerequisite for the entering into force of the treaty according to the Annex-II of the CTBT. One could understand that state signatories may has legislative or

political reasons for delay in ratification, but clear declaration of a signatory not to ratify a treaty anytime in the future is odd and serious threat to the CTBT. This issue has to be considered as a matter of urgency at the next Prep.Com of the CTBTO.

B- The US - NPR has envisaged the possibility of using nuclear weapons in case of us is subjected to alleged Cyberattack. Due to many technical, security and legal complications of such attacks, is shall give a blank check to US to use nuclear weapons.

C- The US -NPR has clearly declared the US determination for modernization of nuclear weapons, which is in full contravention with the NPT, creating a dangerous era of nuclear arm race.

The lack protest by EU on such serious concern might be due to lack of consensus in EU as the result of the opposition of the two nuclear weapons member states of EU, possibly reserving their right to also do so in the future.

The EU clarification in this respect is essential in removing ambiguity and preventing further damage to credibility.

#### **EU vis-à-vis JCPOA<sup>4</sup>**

The internationally negotiated Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 14 July 2015 {12}, or the Iran nuclear agreement, concluded between Iran, the P5 + 1 and the EU is widely considered to be a very important political, diplomatic, mutually beneficial achievement which contributes greatly to the strengthening and indeed survival of the NPT. Since the entry into force of the JCPOA in January 2016, the IAEA has consistently verified Iran's compliance with all of its international safeguards obligations under the JCPOA, which constitute the strictest safeguards regime ever applied to any NPT State Party.

Without the JCPOA, and with continued and extensive sanctions on Iran as well as the threats of attack on Iranian nuclear installations, Iran could have considered withdrawing from the NPT with all its negative consequences. Therefore, full implementation of the JCPOA by Iran as confirmed 12 times by the IAEA is a unique opportunity which should be missed {13}.

The US unilateral withdrawal from JCPOA which was adopted by consensus, by P5 +1, including US, is undoubtedly a violation of this multilateral agreement and the UN security Council Resolution 2231. In addition, the US re-imposing sanctions and threat against other countries cooperating with Iran in fulfillment of their obligations under JCPOA, shall have serious impacts on the Non-proliferation regime in general and on the next NPT Review Conference in 2020 in specific.

At his confirmation hearing before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 12. April 2018, CIA Director Mike Pompeo, President Trump's nominee for US Secretary of State, stated in his views regarding the JCPOA that he had "seen no evidence that (Iran is) not in compliance

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<sup>4</sup> Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

today”. And regarding the perceived need to “fix” or pull out of the deal he said: "Iran wasn't racing to a weapon before the deal. There is no indication that...if the deal no longer existed that they would immediately turn to racing to create a nuclear weapon..." To which the Iranian Foreign Minister replied on 13. April 2018: "... in the past Iran was sanctioned over false claims that it sought nuclear weapons. Now, sanctions must be reimposed because we seek no nukes?" {14}.

It has to be recalled that EU in 2003 Iran accepted the request of EU3 to suspend all enrichment related activities, apply Additional Protocol and the modified code 3.1 of Subsidiary Arrangement, with the assurances in return, that the file of allegations in the IAEA will be soon closed and

cooperation of EU with Iran shall be promoted. After two and half years of full commitment of voluntary measure by Iran, EU3 was not able to realize its commitments, giving the excuse that since US was not board, they could not deliver what they had guaranteed! The worst was the same EU3 proposed a resolution against Iran conveying the issue to the UNSC after Iran suspended its voluntary suspension!

Now the history repeats itself with different dimensions. Not only EU3 but the whole EU credibility is again at stake, after US disregarded the JCPOA, parties to its, including the EU.

So far, the EU has strongly supported the JCPOA and emphasized its commitments to preserve it and continue its cooperation with Iran. Word has to turn into action. EU has to give a legally binding assurances in preventing the US sanctions and threat against European firm be realized.

Considering the case of JCPOA and other serious cases such as US trade war against EU, this is a unique historical strategic opportunity for EU to stand on its own fit, resist the US pressure, dictating on matters related to national interest security of its member states and preventing independent cooperation with other countries in the world.

#### **EU and UN Resolutions on nuclear disarmament in 2016 as an example {4}:**

A short glance on positions of EU members on couple of UN resolutions on nuclear disarmament gives some messages on the status quo:

- **Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (71/259)**

Against: Italy

In favor: rest

➤ **Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations (71/258)**

Against: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom

Abstention: Finland, Netherlands

In favor: rest

➤ **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (71/86)**

In favor: all

➤ **The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (71/83)**

Abstention: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, , France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, , Poland, Romania, , United Kingdom

In favor: rest

➤ **United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (71/78)**

In favor: all (adopted by consensus)

➤ **Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (71/75)**

Against: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, , Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom

## **Conclusion**

*The above- mentioned records of the role of the EU in international arena indicate the lack of solid decisive position and role in crucial historical international security developments. However, despite its complex and non-cohesive nature, if the European Union comes out of the security umbrella of the United States, thus stands on its own feet, and gets rid of imposed US- global policies, it would then be able to benefit from its great potential to establish strategic trustful relation with other nations. Consequently, it will be able to contribute effectively to WMD non- proliferation and disarmament, global peace and security at large.*

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